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CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE INSTRUMENTS WHERE
ADOPTED CHILDREN ARE CONCERNED: II*
]. Wesley Olert

B. Context: Construction of Instrument as a Whole
Thus far in the discussion the attempt has been to consider a number of common terms of general designation, such as "children,"
"issue," and "heirs," detached from other language with which they
may be found and disassociated from the circumstances under which
they may be used, with a view to estimating their intrinsic significance in
resolving questions as to the effect of adoption upon the identification
of persons designated by them. The examination from this point: of·
view could lead to the deduction that in themselves the particular
terms of designation furnished varying degrees of assistance to the
interpreter of the instrument. It was not meant to suggest, however,
that the particular words were in fact to be considered alone. True,
courts now and then have ascribed an inherent finality to the meaning of
one or more of these terms, in so far as they bear on the subject, but in
the great percentage of instances it has been otherwise. The backdrop
of circumstance has been recognized. So has the context a:fforded by the
rest of the instrument. As sometimes explicitly stated, the intention is to
be gathered from the instrument as a whole.176

* The first installment of this article appeared in the February issue, 43 M1cH.
L. REV, 705 (1945).
tA.B., Dickinson College; Ll,.B., Dickinson School of Law; LL.M., University
of Michigan Law School. Member of Pennsylvania and Philadelphia bars; author of
articles in Dickinson Law Review.-Ed.
176
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Comer
v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E. (2d) 420 (1942); Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 149
A. 515 (1·<)30); Pierce v. Farmers State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 480; Warden v. Overman, 155 Iowa l, 135 N.W. 649 (1912); Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky.
675, 142 S.W. (2d) 680 (1940); Ultz v. Upham, 177 Mich. 351, 143 N.W. 66
(1913); In re Holden, 207 Minn. 211,291 N.W. 104 (1940); Reindersv. Koppelman, 94 Mo.. 338, 7 S.W. 288 (1887); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo.
17, 76 S.W. (2d) 685 (1934); Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W. (2d)
660 (1941); Graves v. Graves, 349 Mo. 722, 163 S.W. (2d) 544 (1942); Melek v.
Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 213 Mo. App. 572, 250 S.W. 614 (1923); In re
Clarke's Estate, 125 Neb. 625, 251 N.W. 279 (1933); Adrian v. Koch, 83 N.J. Eq.
484, 91 A. 123 (1914), affirmed 84 N.J. Eq. 195, 93 A. 1083 (1915); In re
McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940); Tankersley v. Davis, 195 N.C.
542, 142 S.E. 765 (1928); Stevenson's Estate, 47 Pa. Dist & Co. 215 (1943); Smith
v. Bradford, 51 R.I. 289, 154 A. 272 (1931); Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578, 117
S.W. (2d) 413 (1938); Mitchell's Will, 157 Wis. 327, 147 N.W. 332 (1914).
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One must, of course, be circumspect about such a bromide. In itself
it may be verbiage; what it produces may be camouflage. Since the context is of importance, however, it should not be disregarded, and merit
may lie in considering some of the connected language upon which
courts have at least professed to rely in determining whether an
adoptee, for example, was included within the reference of a will or
other private instrument to a person's "children " "issue " "heirs " or
'
'
'
other relatives.
The item of context seized upon may be but another word or expression. Thus the instrument maker's inclination to employ indiscriminately two or more different terms of general designation to identify
the same persons or similarly situated persons has sometimes furnished
the court with a reason for construing one of the terms as having as fully
intnnsic exclusionary force, with respect to adoptees, as the most exclusionary of the terms used.111 In a deed's reference to any child or children whom the life tenant might have "born" to her, the quoted word
supplied evidence of a probable intention to exclude from the designation a child adopted by the life tenant.178 A similar result was reached
under a devise to the testator's daughter if she "have" heirs ( otherwise
over to others at her death), the word "have" being suggestive of
"born to." 179 And a will which directed payment of the principal of
separate trusts to the respective la~ful issue of each of the life tenants
except one, and which, as to the principal of the trust for him, provided
177
In the following cases, for example, the word "heirs," which is probably the
least exclusionary of the terms considered, drew meaning from its apparently indiscriminate co-use with "issue," "children," "grandchildren," or -"issue of the body:"
Hall v. Crandall, (Del.Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545; Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377,
24 S.E. (2d) 381 (1943); Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788 (1925);
Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930); In re Clarke's Estate, 125
Neb. 625, 251 N.W. 279 (1933). Other illustrations of the general point are afforded
by Miller v. Wick, 311 Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924); Moffet v. Cash, 346 Ill. 287,
178 N.E. 658 (1931), dissenting opinion 346 Ill. 311, 179 N.E. 186 (1931); Blaker
v. Blaker, 131 Kan. 833, 293 P. 517 (1930); Graves v. Graves, 349 Mo. 722, 163
S.W., (2d) 544 (1942); Dulfon v. Keasbey, 111 N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932);
Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932). It will be noted that the
argument can be reversed, so that a designation having an ordinarily strong exclusionary operation may be weakened by its apposition with a less exclusionary word.
See in this connection Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689
(1921) and Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588 (1927).
178
Tankersley v. Davis, 195 N.C. 542, 142 S.E. 765 (1928). In Blaker v.
Blaker, 131 Kan. 833, 293 P. 517 (1930), the testator spoke of his son's "issue, born in
lawful wedlock, of the body." The expression was viewed as manifestly excluding the
son's adoptee. To similar effect is Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76, 151 A. 131
(1930).
179
Nickerson v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343, 115 N.E. 588 (1917).
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that it should be paid to his lawful issue, "if he should have any," was
said thereby to show, when viewed in connection with the fact that this
beneficiary had an adopted child when the will was executed, an intention to refer only to issue who might be born to the beneficiary.180
Express reference to relations by "blood" naturally points to exclusion of one related by adoption only.181 Allusion to a person's "heirs,"
in plural form, has given courts evidence of an intent to exclude an
adoptee who, if he qualified at all, would be the sole taker.1821 In a
conveyance of a farm to the grantor's daughter for life, then to her'
heirs, a recital that the consideration was "natural" love and a:ffection
and a mutual division of property among the heirs and children of the
grantors helped to induce the conclusion that a child adopted by the
grantor's daughter did not take the remainder.188 In another case, where
payment of the principal of a trust was to be made to the life beneficiary
when he should have a child, his lawful issue, who should "attain unto
the age of three years," the quoted words suggested to the court a requirement by the testator that a child, born to the beneficiary, should
live through the perilous period in child life, and indicated that an
adoption would not satisfy the will.184
A provision of manifest disinheritance, giving the testator's adopted
daughter five dollars, went far in signifying that she did not take under
a gift of the residuary estate in remainder to the testator's heirs at law.185
180

Matter of Hoyt's Estate, 120 Misc. 188, 197 N.Y.S. 828 (1923).
Matter of Eilis's Estate, 178 Misc. 491, 34 N.Y.S. (2d) 884 (1942), affirmed
264 App. Div. 846, 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 187 (1942) (adoptee excluded from designation
of children of testator's first cousins, where he elsewhere defined his first cousins to
include those only who were related to him "by blood"); Stewardson's Estate, 16 Pa.
Dist. & Co. 195 (1931) (dictum); Trustees, Executors & Agency Co., Ltd. v. Rowley,
[1939] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 146 (designation of all the nephews and nieces of the testatrix "of the blood").
182
Warden v. Overman, 155 Iowa 1, 135 N.W. 649 (1912); Morrison v. Ses-sions, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249 (1888). Compare Matter of Levy's Estate, 138
Misc. 670, 245 N.Y.S. 710 (1927), holding that the use of the plural form of designation in a gift to the "grandchildren" of the testatrix evinced an intention to include
an adoptee of a daughter of the testatrix, where the testatrix had only one blood grandchild when she executed the will. In Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 126 A. 254 (1924),
the plural form "children" was treated as indicating a belief that the adopter might have
a natural child or children in addition to the child she had adopted.
188
Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W. (2d) 680 (1940).
184
Miller v. Wick, 311 Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924).
185
Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578, 117 S.W. (2d) 413 (1938). To the same
effect is Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76, 151 A. 131 (1930). Compare Public
Trustee v. Pilkington, 31 N.Z.L.R. (C.A.) 770 (1912), in which it was held that
the description of the recipient of a pecuniary legacy as "my adopted daughter" was
181
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So, too, a will's reference to an adoptee in a particular way at one point
may imply that the adoptee is not within another term elsewhere employed in the instrument; as where a testatrix, after making some
special bequests, including one to her adopted daughter, whom she described as "my young friend," left the rest of her estate to her lawful
heirs; 186 or where the testator, who had adopted his own· grandchild,
made a bequest of money to him as his "grandchild," and then created a
trust of the residuary estate for the benefit of his "children." 187 Similarly, when taken in connection with the gift of half of the corpus of a
testamentary trust to one whom the test'ator and his wife had adopted, a
gift of the other half to the nearest and lawful kin of the testator and
his wife did not include the adoptee.188 And in still another instance an
intention to exclude an adopted child of a daughter of the testatrix
from a gift of trust principal to the daughter's lawful issue was discovered in the failure of the testatrix to refer to the adoptee by name, when
elsewhere in the will she had referred by name to her ten natural
grandchildren.189
' Not infrequently the general scheme or purpose of a particular will
has been said to shed light on the subject at hand. Thus the inclusion
of an adopted child of a son of the testatrix within the benefit of trusts
in favor of "children" and "issue" of her sons was deemed to have been
inferable from the general purpose of the testatrix, µisclosed by the
will as a whole, to relieve her sons of the burden of supporting their
children.100 A like result followed in part from a testator's indicated
not strong enough to eliminate her as the beneficiary of ·a trust of the residuary estate
for the testator's "children."
186
Warden v. Overman, 155 Iowa I, 135 N.W. 649 (1912). In Matter of
Hoyt's Estate, 120 Misc. 188, 197 N.Y.S. 828 (1923), a devise of real estate to a husband and wife for life, remainder "to their adopted daughter," was said to disclose the
manner in which the testatrix thought of the adoptee and thus to suggest the exclusion
of the adoptee from "lawful issue'~ of the adopter, as that term was used in a gift of
the corpus of a trust created out of part of the residuary estate. Union Trust Co. v.
Campi, 51 R.I. 76, 151 A. 272 (1931), is to similar effect. Compare Public Trustee
v. Pilkington, 31 N.Z.L.R. (C.A.) 770 (1912), in which it was held that the description of the recipient of a pecuniary legacy as "my adopted daughter" was not
strong enough to eliminate her as the beneficiary of a trust of the residuary estate for
the testator's "children/'
187
Adrian v. Koch, 83 N.J. Eq. 484, 91 A. 123 (1914), affirmed 84 N.J. Eq.
195, 93 A. 1083 (1915). See also Clarke v. Rathbone, 221 Mass. 574,' 109 N.E.
651 (1915).
188
Reinders v. Koppelman, 94 Mo. 338, 7 S.W. 288 (1887).
189
N.Y. Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Viele, 161 N.Y. II, 55 N.E. 3u (1899).
190
Mooney v. Tolles, III Conn. I, 149 A. 515 (1930).
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purpose to effect equality among several lines of descent, where exclusion of an adoptee from the term "issue" would have defeated that
objective.191 On the other hand, restrictions placed by the testator on
the power to dispose of the subject matter of a benefit, as through the
in.sertion of a spendthrift clause,192 a prohibition against sale,1"93 a provision confining the first taker's interest to a fee defeasible on his death
without issue,194 or a direction against control of the property. by the
husband of the life beneficiary,m have been regarded in some instances
as supplying evidence of an intention that the first takers also shall not
have power in effect to pass the property by adoption to a stranger to
the blood. And a similar conclusion has been drawn from the testator's
studied effort to make his will an instrument of benefit to those of his
blood or those for whom he has special concern, by gifts of the rest of
his property to them,196 or by an ultimate limitation in their favor in a
described· event, such as a failure of the first taker to have children.1911'
191
Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588 (1927). The same
reasoning is employed in Mooney v. Tolles, III Conn. I, 149 A. 515 (1930). Conversely, if the effect of a construction that an adoptee is included in a general designation will be to give him a greater share of the estate than persons related to the testator
naturally at the same level of descent, this tends to support a holding which excludes
the adoptee from the designation. See Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469,
17 A. (2d) 517 (1941); Adrian v. Koch, 83 N.J. Eq. 484, 91 A. 123 (1914), affirmed
84 N.J. Eq. 195, 93 A. 1083 (1915); N.Y. Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Viele, 161 N.Y. II,
55 N.E. 31 I (1899); Einstein v. Michaelson, 107 Misc. 661, 177 N.Y.S. 474
(1919); Matter of Cotheal's Estate, 121 Misc. 665, 202 N.Y.S. 268 (1923).
192
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, II2 A. 689 (1921); Blaker
v. Blaker, 131 Kan. 833, 293 P. 517 (1930).
198
Wildman's Appeal, III Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 (1930). But see Bray v.
Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N.E. 446, 55 N.E. 510 (1899).
194
Wallace v. Noland, 246 rn. 535, 92 N.E. 956 (1910); Nickerson v. Hoover,
70 Ind. App. 343, II5 N.E. 588 (1917).
195
Wildman's Appeal, III Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 (1930).
196
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 99 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Wyeth
v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441, 11 N.E. 729 (1887); Adrian v. Koch, 83 N.J. Eq. 484, 91
A. 123 (1914), affirmed 84 N.J. Eq. 195, 93 A. 1083 (1915); Dulfon v,. Keasbey,
III N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932); Smith v. Bradford, 51 R.I. 289, 154 A.
272 (1931).
197
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, II2 A. 689 (1921); Casper
v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N.E. 123 (1925); Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa
641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930); Blaker v. Blaker, 131 Kan. 8l3, 293 P. 517 (1930);
Morton v. American Security & T. Co., 251 App. Div. 31, 295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937),
affirmed 276 N.Y. 475, 12 N.E. (2d) 164 (1937); Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481,
121 N.W. 153 (1909); Mitchell's Will, 157 Wis. 327, 147 N.W. 332 (1914). In
Tirrell v. Bacon, (C.C. Mass. 1880) 3 F. 62, the weight of this factor of context was
insufficient to exclude an adoptee of the testator's son from a gift in remainder to the
son's "children" or "issue."
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C. Surrounding Circumstances
In general
Whether in his use· of a term of general description, such as "children," "issue" or "heirs," the maker of a will, deed or other private
instrument is to be deemed to have intended the inclusion or exclusion
of an adoptee or a person related by adoption is determined not alone
by considering the individual significance of the particular term of
designation employed and the other provisions with which it is found,
but also, as a usual rule, by reading the language in the light of the
circumstanc~ surrounding its forinulation.198 Recognizing that the
meaning of language may vary according to the conditions under which
it is used, the interpreter' l9oks to the circumstances of its use in an effort to accommodate his view to that of the instrument-maker.
If a period of time intervenes between the execution of a will and
the death of the testator, it may also be proper to consider events which
occut in the interval as a further aid in determining the meaning of the
language.199 In most of the cases withilJ. the scope of the present subI.

198
This principle was recognized at least sub silentio in virtually all the cases
considered herein. More direct statement of it will be found in the following: Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, II2 A. 689 (1921); Mooney v. Tolles,
III Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930); Wildman's Appeal, III Conn. 683, 151 A. 265
(1930); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 17 A. (2d) 517 (1941);
O'Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104 (1939), affirmed (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) n5 F. (2d)
956, cert. denied 312 U.S. 707, 61 S. Ct. 829 (1941); Smith Thomas, 317 lll. 150,
147 N.E. 788 (1925); Hale v. Hale, 237 lll. App. 410 (1925); Pierce v. Farmers
State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 480; Nickerson v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343,
Il5 N.E. 588 (1917); Warden v. Overman, 155 Iowa 1, 135 N.W. 649 (1912);
Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930); Woods v. Crump, 283
Ky. 675, 142 S.W. (2d) 680 (1940); Martin v. Aetna L. Ins.. Co., 73 Me. 25
(1881); Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Me. 578, 55 A. 520 (1903); Wilder v. Butler, II6
Me. 389, 102 A. II0 (1917); In re Holden, 207 Minn. 2n, 291 N.W. 104 (1940);
Reinders v. Koppelman, 94 Mo. 338, 7 S.W. 288 (1887); Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo.
442, 147 S.W. (2d) 660 (1941); Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 213 Mo.
App. 572, 250 S.W. 614 (1923); In re Clarke's Estate, 125 Neb. 625, 251 N.W.
279 (1933); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Hall, 125 N.J. Eq. 419, 6 A. (2d) 124
(1939); Morton v. American Security & T. Co., 251 App. Div. 31, 295 N.Y.S. 556
(1937), affirmed 276 N.Y. 475, 12 N.E. (2d) 164 (1937); Smith v. Bradford, 51
R.I. 289, 154 A. 272 (1931); Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578, II7 S.W. (2d) 413
(1938); Mitchell's Will, 157 Wis. 327, 147 N.W. 332 (1914).
199
Rules as to the extent to which events occurring between the execution and
effective date of a will may properly be considered in construing the language in the
will are suggested in 3 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §§ 244, 245 (1940). Compare the
broader statement in Moffet v. Cash, 346 Ill. 287 at 291, 178 N.E. 658 (1931), dissenting opinion 346 Ill. 3II, 179 N.E. 186 (1931), that the intention of the testator
is to be determined from the language in the will considered in the light of the circumstances existing at the time of its execution "and at the death of the testator."

v.
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ject the factual situation did not change materially between the date
the will was executed and the time it became e:ffective. In a number of
instances, however, such a change did occur,2° 0 and where this was so the
later events were sometimes considered in ascertaining the sense of the
language employed.201
Although a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the use
of the language in the instrument is quite generally allowed in the
United States, it should be observed that in some states resort to circumstances is at least nominally conditioned upon the language being
ambiguous. 202 By focusing its attentiqn narrowly upon the words used
and ascribing to them an asserted plain meaning, a court can thus eliminate the opportunity to examine the characterizing environment, as
.well as other extrinsic evidence bearing on the meaning of the language
used. 208 In its application to the present subject this attitude is exemplified in its more objectionable form by several decisions from Pennsylvania and Indiana.204 Our interest here, however, is not so much with
200
In the following cases there was an adoption between the execution of the
will and the death of the testator: Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 S. 900 (1887);
Mooney v. Tolles, I II Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127
Conn. 469, 17 A. (2d) 517 (1941); Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N,E. 446,
55 N.E. 510 (1899); Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463, 192 N.E. 899 (1934);
Young v. Stearns, 234 Mass. 540, 125 N.E. 697 (1920); Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich.
631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927); Dulfon v. Keasbey, I I I N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102
(1932); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Hall, 125 N.J. Eq. 419, 6 A. (2d) 124 (1939);
Matter of Hopkins, 102 App. Div. 458, 92 N.Y.S. 463 (1905); Einstein v. Michaelson, 107 Misc. 661, 177 N.Y.S. 474 (1919); Matter of Wait's Estate, (N.Y. Surr.
1943) 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 735; Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E. (2d) 621
(1943); In re Beatty, Beatty v. Beatty, [1939] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 954. For a case involving a material change in the statutory law as to adoption between the execution
of the will and the death of the testator, see Kohler's Estate, 199 Pa. 455, 49 A. 286
(1901).
201
Mooney v. Tolles, 11 I Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 17 A. (2d) 517 (1941); Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54
N.E. 446, 55 N.E. 510 (1899); Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E. (2d)
621 (1943). Only in Dulfon v. Keasbey, III N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932) did
the court definitely refuse to consider the interim adoption in determining the testator's
intention.
202
Among cases within the scope of the present subject which pay lip-service to
this limitation, see Hall v. Crandall, (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545, and Wallace
v. Noland, 246 Ill. 535, 92 N.E. 956 (1910).
208
See in this connection 9 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE,§§ 2470-2472 (1940).
204
In Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 126 A. 254 (1924), where the will created
a trust of part of the residuary estate for the testator's sister for life and directed that at
her death the principal should be paid to her then surviving child or children and the
issue of any deceased child or children, with gift over in default thereof to the survivors of named nieces and a nephew of the testator, the court held an intention on the
part of the testator to include an adoptee of his sister within the term "child or chil-
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incidentally applicable rules of evidence and formality as with the
significance attached to particular surrounding circumstances which
have in fact been considered by the courts.
2.

Adopter's age; prospects of having natural children

A basis 6f support for the conclusion that · an adopted child was
within a testator's contemplation has occasionally been found in the
circumstance that at the date of the execution of the will, which referred to another's children or issue, it was evident that the person mentioned had little prospect of having natural children.205 Conversely,
dren" could not be established extrinsically by evidence that the· adoption had taken
place long before execution of the will, that the testator knew of it and sppke of the
adoptee as his sister's daughter~ and that the adoptee was treated by the testator and the
rest of the family as· a daughter of the sister. Refusal to consider the evidence was
based on the asserted plain meaning of the words of designation. In Corr's Estate, 338
Pa. 337, 12 A. (2d) 76 (1940), the allegedly plain meaning of a gift to the "children" of the testator's daughter resulted in the rejection of proof that an adopted chlld
of the daughter was included in the testator's household and that affection existed between the testator and the adoptee, as shown by proferred letters and testimony. The
Yates case was mainly relied on in Pier~e v. Farmers State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E.
(2d) 480, in which the court held that, to prove the testator meant to include an
adoptee in a gift in remainder to his son's "child or children," evidence was not admissible that a month -before he executed his will the testator had urged his son to marry
and, in view of the latter's professed sterility, to adopt the person in question. For a
criticism of the attitude of Indiana courts as to the admission of extrinsic evidence, see
Powell, "Construction of Written Instruments," 14 lNo. L. J. 199 at 222-234 (1939).
205
Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588 (1927) (when
the will was executed the testator's sister, to whose issue the trust corpus was to pass at
her death, was sixty-one years old and had been married forty years without having
had children born to her); Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N.E. 446, 55 N.E.
510 (1899) (when the will was executed the testator's daughter, to whose children he
gave her share of the trust corpus if she died before the life beneficiaries, was about
forty-two years old and had been married thirteen years without having borne chil' dren); Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463, 192 N.E. 899 (1934) (the testator had
been informed that his nephew and the latter's wife, in favor of whose children there
was a gift over in remainder if the nephew predeceased:' the life beneficiary, could
have no natural children); Public Trustee v. Pilkington, 31 N.Z.L.R. (C.A.) 770
( 1912) (the testator, whose residuary estate was to be held in trust for his children,
was sixty-five years old when he executed the will, had had no natural children, and
must have supposed he probably would not have any). See also Martin v. Aetna L. Ins.
Co., 73 Me. 25 (1881), in which the circumstances indicated that when the testator
took out a policy of life insurance payable to his wife or, if she predeceased him, to
their children, they did not expect to have any other child than their adopted one.
But in Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 126 A. 254 (1924), the asserted fact that the testator knew that a life beneficiary, to whose child or children he gave the principal of a
trust at her death, w'as too old to bear children, was said to have no weight, because the
testator's use of the plural form "children" could not be satisfactorily explained if,
knowing that she could not bear chil~en, he meant "child" to refer to the one she had
adopted. The court seems to have overlooked the possibility that the testator con-
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where the probabilities at the execution of the instrument seemed to
favor the birth of children to one whose children or issue were designated, this sometimes furnished a reason for holding that adoptees were
not to be included.206

3. Knowledge of and reaction to adoption; adoption before
instrument becomes irrevocable
It is also usual to attach considerable weight to the circumstance
that the maker of the instrument knew of the adoption when the instrument was executed or before it became irrevocable. His attitude toward
the adoption may be a particularly important circumstance.
Thus, if the adoption occurred before the execution of an instrument, such as a will or deed of trust, which made provision for the
adopter's children or issue, and the testator or settlor knew of the adoption, and particularly if he approved of it, the adoptee has usually been
deemed to be within the designation.201 Where he has not been so retemplated further adoptions by the life beneficiary. Beck v. Dickinson, supra, was
disapproved in Pierce v. Farmers State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 480, wherein
the court held that evidence was not admissible to show, inter alia, that before executing
his will, which gave the corpus of a trust to his son's child or children• at the son's
death, the testator discussed with the son the latter's sterility and urged him to marry
the appellant's mother and adopt the appellant.
206
Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930) (the testator's
daughter, on whose death without children a gift over was conditioned, was enceinte
when the will was executed); Morton v. American Security & T. Co., 251 App. Div.
31,295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937), affirmed 276 N.Y. 475, 12 N.E. (2d) 164 (1937) (when
the will was executed the circumstances suggested that, as her sisters had done, the
testator's daughter would marry and have children, who would qualify under a gift in
remainder to her issue or, in default of issue, to her heirs at law and next of kin
(meaning lineal descendants), per stirpes]; Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121
N.W. 153 (1909) (testator's granddaughter, to whose children living at her death he
devised land in remainder, was an unmarried girl when the will was made and the
testator died). As tending to support the same proposition, see also Wilder v. Butler,
II6 Me. 389, 102 A. 1 IO (1917); Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 213 Mo.
App. 572, 250 S.W. 614 (1923); Mitchell's Will, 157 Wis. 327, 147 N.W. 332
(1914).
,
207
Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588 (1927) (adoption by the testator's sister antedated execution of the will by twenty-four years; the
testator knew and approved of the adoption and acted as sponsor and godfather for the
adoptee, with whom he was on very affectionate terms); Munie v. Gruenwald, 289 Ill.
468, I 24 N .E. 60 5 ( l 919) (adoption by the testator's daughter antedated execution of
the will by seven years; the testator knew of the adoption, always treated the adoptee in
the manner he treated his natural grandchildren, and knew that she was recognized
everywhere as his daughter's child); Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463, 192 N.E.
899 (1934) (one adoption by the testator's nephew antedated execution of the will by
four months and was effected at the suggestion of the testator; but see Pierce v. Farmers
State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 480, which disapproves this decision, at least
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garded, notwithstanding his adoption before execution of the instrument, it has appeared that the adoption was in effect regretted,208 or that
the maker of the instrument did not know of it,200 or that evidence as
to knowledge or approval was lacking 210 or that such evidence was reas regards consideration of the evidence); Martin v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 73 Me. 25
( 188 I) (adoption by insured and his wife was prior to issuance of policy of insurance
on his life, payable to the wife or, if she died before him, to their children; insured
and his wife made every effort to indicate that the adoptee was their own and to conceal
from him all information to the contrary); In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A•.
(2d) 340 (1940) (adoption of two children by testator's son occurred about a month
before the will was executed, and the testator was fully aware of it); Von Beck v.
Thomsen, 44 App. Div. 373, 60 N.Y.S. 1094 (1899), affirmed 167 N.Y. 601, 60 N.E.
1121 (1901) (will giving pecuniary legacy to the child or children, by representation,
of each of the brothers and sisters of the te_stator's wife who predeceased her was executed fourteen years after the d_eath of a sister who, to the testator's knowledge, had
adopted and predeceased a child); In re Truman, 27 R.I. 209, 61 A. 598 (1905)
(adoption by brother of testatrix antedated execution of the will by thirty-nine years;
testatrix knew of the adoption, referred to the adoptee as her niece, and always treated
the adoptee as one of her brother's children). See also Matter of Levy's Estate, 138
Misc. 670, 245 N.Y.S. 710 (1927); Public Trustee v. Pilkington, 31 N.Z.L.R. (C.A.)
770 ( 1912). Much. the same result may be accomplished by statute, such as was involved in Hill's Estate, 30 Pa. Dist. 477 (1921). In Stevenson's Estate, 47 Pa. Dist. &
Co. 215 (1943) the court said it could be assumed that the testatrix knew her niece
had adopted a child in due form, where the will was executed almost two years after the
adoption. In Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E. (2d) 420 (1942), the court
specifically left open the question of the effect of an adoption occurring before execution
of a will. Adoption prior to the execution of the instrument was involved in several cases
in which the adoptee was held to be within a reference to a person's heirs, next of kin or
statutory distributees, but the point under consideration was not discussed. Rauch v.
Metz, (Mo. 1919) 212 S.W. 357; Dodin v. Dodin, 16 App. Div. 42, 44 N.Y.S.
800 (1897), affirmed 162 N.Y. 635, 57 N.E. uo8 (1900); U.S. Trust Co. v. Hoyt
150 App. Div. 621, 135 N.Y.S. 849 (1912); U.S. Trust Co. v. Hoyt, u5 Misc. 663,
190 N.Y.S. 166 (1915), affirmed 173 App. Div. 930, 158 N.Y.S. 1133 (1916),
affirmed 223 N.Y. 616, I 19 N.E. 1083 (1918); Re McGillivray, Purcell v. Hendricks, ·
[1925] 3 Dom. L. R. (C.A. Br. Col.) 854.
208
Warden v. Overman, 155 Iowa 1, 135 N.W. 649 (1912) (adoption by
testatrix was treated by the parties as ineffective, although friendly relations between
her and the adoptee were continued); Morrison v. Sessions, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W.
249 (1888) (family relationship between testator and adoptee lasted only a few
months; testatqr understood adoption had been revoked); Union Trust Co. v. Campi,
51 R.I. 76, 151 A. 131 (1930) (testator disinherited his adoptee by leaving her a
dollar in his will); Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578, II7 S.W. (2d) 413 (1938)
( testator's adopted child left him soon after the adoption, and testator disinherited the
adoptee in his will).
209
Matter of Haight, 63 Misc. 624, II8 N.Y.S. 745 (1909).
210
Woodcock's Appeal, 103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907); Graves v. Graves, 349
Mo. 722, 163 S.W. (2d) 544 (1942); Re Donald, Baldwin v. Mooney, [1929] 2
Dom. L. R. (S.C. Can.) 244. In Matter of Dudley's Estate, 168 Misc. 695, 6 N.Y.S.
(2d) 489 (1938), it was said that the fact that the testator was "not on unfriendly
terms" with the children adopted by his niece fell far short of the demonstration re-
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jected,211 or that the context dictated the decision.212 In a New Jersey
case the point was put this way:
". . . Where a testator knows that his son has taken into his
home an infant and adopted him and given him his name, and the
testator, by a will thereafter executed, makes a class gift to the children or issue of his son, it should be presumed in the absence of
contrary indications, that he meant to include the adopted child
within the class. The testator accepts the situation and relationship
which the adopting parents have created." 218
So, too, a testator's knowledge of an adoption occurring between the
execution of the will and an appreciable length of time before his
death,214 particularly if coupled with his approbation of the adoption,
has sometimes been regarded as sufficient to bring the adoptee within a
benefit conferred by the will upon the adopter's children or issue.215
The stated reason for this is that the testator is presumed to know the
legal e:ffect of the adoption, and his failure to change his will, which
speaks only from his death, so as to exclude the adoptee expressly, is not
quired to establish an affirmative desire to include them in a gift over to the niece's
"descendants," contrary to the technical meaning of the term as used by the testator, a
lawyer.
211
Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 126 A. 254 (1924).
212
Gr-aves v. Graves, 349 Mo. 722, 163 S.W. (2d) 544 (1942); Adrian v.
Koch, 83 N.J. Eq. 484, 91 A. 123 (1914), affirmed 84 N.J. Eq. 195, 93 A. 1083
(1915); N.Y. Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Viele, 161 N.Y. u, 55 N.E. 3u (1899); Matter of Hoyt's Estate, 120 Misc. 188, 197 N.Y.S. 828 (1923); Matter of Ellis's Estate,
178 Misc. 491, 34 N.Y.S. (2d) 884 (1942), affirmed 264 App. Div. 846, 36 N.Y.S.
(2d) 187 (1942); Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76, 151 A. 131 (1930)9 Hassell v. Frey1 131 Tex. 578, u7 S.W. (2d) 413 (1938); Trustees, Executors & Agency
Co., Ltd. v. Rowley, [1939] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 146.
218
In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140 at 147, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940).
2
l4 In Mooney v. Tolles, III Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930), the court intimated
that a "considerable" length of time between the adoption and the death of the testator would be required.
215
Mooney v. Tolles, I I I Conn. 1, 149 A. 5 I 5 ( I 930) ( testatrix knew and approved of adoption by her son); Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N.E. 446, 55
N.E. 510 (1899) (adoption by testator's daughter, about eighteen months before he
died, was with his knowledge); Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463, 192 N.E. 899
( 1934) ( adoptions by testator's nephew, both before and after execution of the will,
were with the testator's knowledge and at his suggestion; but this case was disapproved
in Pierce v. Farmers State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 480, at least in so far as
consideration of the extrinsic evidence is concerned); Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C.
644, 24 S.E. (2d) 621 (1943) (testator knew and approved of the adoption by his
grandchild, occurring four years before the testator's death, and treated the adoptee
as he did his other great grandchildren). See also dictum in In re Clarke's Estate, 125
Neb. 625, 251 N.W. 279 (1933).
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without signifi.cance.216 Conversely, the testator's unfavorable attitude
toward an intervening adoption has led to the exclusion of the adoptee
from the designation of the adopter's children or issue, where accompanied by the understanding on the testator's part that the adoptee
would not take under the will.217 And where the adoption occurred between the making of the will and the testator's death, but not until after
he had become permanently incompetent, inclusion of the adoptee within
a provision of the will in Javor of the adopter's children could not be
predicated on knowledge and approval of the adoption:218
Technically a court's consideration of such intervening events is difficult to support,219 and there is authority directly opposed to it.220 A
ready sort of equity undoubtedly results, however, from heeding the
testator's reaction to an adoption which takes place to his knowledge
before his death, even though after he has executed the will
-

4. Ignorance of the adoption; adoption after instrument
becomes irrevocable '
The preceding subdivision noted the significance, as a matter of surrounding circumstance, of the instrument-maker's knowledge and ap-·
proval or disapproval of an adoptidn occurring prior to the execution or
effective date of the instrument. In the nature of things, however,
216
Mooney v. Tolles, I I I Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930); Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind.
App. 432, 54 N.E. 446, 55 N.E. 510 (1899); Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644,
24 S.E. (2d) 621 (1943).
217
Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 17 A. (2d) 517 (1941) (evidence admitted to show that although the testator liked the adopted child of his son,
he did not know that the adoption had actually taken place; that he disapproved the
proposal of it; that from a lawyer's advice he believed an adoptee would not take under
his will; and that he contemplated making a new will which would expressly exclud~
adoptees as takers thereunder).
·
218
Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927).
219 Perhaps a technical justification can rest on the class character of the gift and
the :fluctuation in the class membership presumably contemplated at the execution of the
will. See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT§ 244, comments e and f (1940).
220
Dulfon v. Keasbey, II I N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932). And see Matter
of Hopkip.s, 102 App. Div. 458, 92 N.Y.S. 463 (1905), and Matter of Wait's Estate,
(N.Y. Surr. 1943) 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 735, for intimation that an adoption between execution of the will and the testator's death should not be considered in determining the
meaning of the will. In several instances the significance, if any, of the circumstances
that the adoption intervened between the making of the will and the testator's death
was not discussed. Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 S. 900 (1887); Young v. Stearns,
234 Mass. 540, 125 N.E. 697 (1920); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Hall, 125 N.J. Eq.
419, 6 A. (2d) 124 (1939); Einstein v. Michaelson, 107 Misc. 661, 177 N.Y.S. 474
(1919). The matter may be controlled expressly by statute, as in In re Beatty, Beatty
v. Beatty, [1939] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 954.

1945}

CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS

neither an adoption nor knowledge of and reaction to it on the part of
the maker of the instrument can be a characterizing circumstance, shedding light on the meaning of the language employed, if the instrument
has become operative before the adoption.
Thus, where a deed of trust, effective in 1914, provided that in
event of the death of a child of the settlor the child or children of the
deceased child should receive a stated share of the income, the fact that
a son of the settlor adopted a child in I 92 3 and another in I 92 5, and
that the settlor recognized the adoptees as his grandchildren and approved of them as such, even to the extent of making provision for them
in his will, could not affect the interpretation of the deed of trust and
bring them within its reference.221
It will be seen readily that to discuss an event, such as an adoption,
which does not occur until after an instrument has become effective,
is to stress what is not itself significant but merely suggestive, in a
circumlocutory way, of that which ~ay be significant; namely, the
absence of knowledge or anticipation of the adoption when the instrument was executed or when it became effective. Read with this in mind,
cases which emphasize that the adoption occurred after the operative
date of the instrument are somewhat more intelligible than if they are
taken to imply that the subsequent event of adoption is itself meaningful as a guide to interpretation.
If the instrument in question be a will, as is usually true, it is readily apparent also that in order for the adoption to be subsequent in
point of time to the effective date of the instrument its author cannot
himself be the adopter. This is a point which is of interest in connection
with rules of construction which ·depend in their application upon
whether or not the maker of the instrument is also the adopter.222
Reverting to the conclusion that the only constructional significance
which properly can be attached to a subsequent adoption lies in its
tendency to suggest that when the instrument was executed or became
effective its maker did not have the adoption or adoptee specifically in
mind, we face directly the fundamental question whether to a negative
circumstance of this character as much weight should be attached as in
fact is attached to it by most courts. It is very easy to slip into the false
assumption that because affirmative knowledge of the adoption and approval or disapproval of it is an active circumstance, pointing to the
meaning of the language of the instrument, the negative situation in221 Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932). Accord:
Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E. (2d) 621 (1943).
222
See infra, III, B, 2.
·
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valved in the absence of anticipation of an adoption is equally signi:fica.nt. It is believed that the mere absence of anticipation of adoption is
essentially a neutral element, to which no particular importance can be
attached. 223 It should be remembered that most of the troublesome
designations encountered are in the class form, contemplating the introduction of unknown persons into the group. In an opinion, therefore,
holding that one adopted by the testator's son after the testator's death
is not within a provision of the will in favor of the son's children, determinable as of the son's death, there is no relevancy to a remark by
the court, such as is commonly encountered, that when the will was
executed and the testator died the adoptee was wholly unknown to him
and, in fact, had not yet been born.224 As much pertinence would lie in
a similar remark made to support a decision that a child born to the son
after the testator's death should be deemed excluded from the designated class.
. Theoretical objections aside, it must be acknowledged that a long
line of decisions, all incidentally involving the situation where the instrument-maker was a stranger to the adoption, can be cited for the view
that the fact that an adoption occurs after the instrument has become effective ( or, according to some opinions, after the instrument was executed) strongly indicates that an adoptee was not within the intendment of a designation of the adopter's children, issue or like relatives,225
228

In re Holden, 207 Minn. 2II, 291 N.W. 104 (1940).
See, for example, observation that the adoptee had not been born when the will
was made or the testator died, in Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788
(1925); Moffet v. Cash, 346 Ill. 287, 178 N.E. 658 (1931), dissenting opinion 346
Ill. 3II, 179 N.E. 186 (1931); Nickerson v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343, II5 N.E.
588 (1917); Hutchins v. Browne, 253 Mass. 55, 147 N.E. 899 (1925); Thorp's
Estate, 90 Pitts. (Pa.) L.J. 493 (1942); In re Smith's Will, 95 Vt. 97, II2 A. 897
(1921).
225
Unless otherwise noted, the parenthetical references after the citations refer
to the approximate length of time between the effective date of the instrument and the
adoption: Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 95 Conn. 61, II2 A. 689 (1921) (twelve
years); Mooneyv. Tolles, III Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930) (seven years; dictum);
Wildman's Appeal, III Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 (1930) (fourteen years); Hall v.
Crandall, (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545 (one year); Huxley v. Security Trust Co.,
(Del. Ch. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 679 (six years); Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.
(2d) 420 (1942) (fourteen years); Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 24 S.E. (2d)
381 (1943) (seven years); Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788 (1925) (five
years); Moffet v. Cash, 346 Ill. 287, 178 N.E. 658 (1931), dissenting opinion 346
Ill. 3II, 179 N.E. 186 (1931) (twenty-seven years); Hale v. Hale, 237 Ill. App.
410 (1925) (five years); Nickerson v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343, II5 N.E. 588
(1917) (forty-eight years); Casper v. H~lvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N.E. 123
(1925) (fourteen years); Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W. (2d) 680 (1940)
(forty years); Wilder v. Butler, II6 Me. 389, 102 A. 110 (1917) (sixteen years);
224
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although it is otherwise if the reference is to his statutory heirs or next of
kin. 226 The fact of the posterior date of the adoption has been descrjbed
Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927) (seven years after will was
made; two years after testator became incompetent); Reinders v. Koppelman, 94 Mo.
338, 7 S.W. 288 (1887) (thirteen years); In re Clarke's Estate, 125 Neb. 625, 251
N.W. 279 (1933) (three years); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.J. 407, 14 A. 557 (1887)
(forty-seven years); Alµmeyer v. Miller, 102 N.J. L. 54, 131 A. 54 (1925), affirmed
103 N.J. L. 617, 137 A. 543 (1927) (three years); Dulfon v. Keasbey, III N.J. Eq.
223, 162 A. 102 (1932) (nine months after execution of will); Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Hall, 125 N.J. Eq. 419, 6 A. (2d) 124 (1939) (three years after execution of will; two years after execution of trust deed); In re Fisler, 131 N.J. Eq. 310,
25 A. (2d) 265 (1942), affirmed 133 N.J. Eq. 421, 30 A. (2d) 894 (1943) (thirtysix years); Matter of Marsh's Will, 143 Misc. 609, 257 N.Y. S. 514 (1932) {twentythree years); Matter of Nelson's Estate, 143 Misc. 843, 258 N.Y.S. 667 (1932) (two
years; dictum); Matter of Conant's Estate, 144 Misc. 743, 259 N.Y.S. 885 (1932)
(one year); Matter of Wait's Estate, (N.Y. Surr. 1943) 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 735 (adoption
at undisclosed time after execution of will); Tankersley v. Davis, 195 N.C. 542, 142
S.E. 765 (1928) (three years); Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E. (2d) 621
(1943) (two and six years); Puterbaugh's Estate, 261 Pa. 235, 104 A. 601 (1918)
(four years); Bealor's Estate, 23 Pa. Dist. I I 17 (1914) (adoption at undisclosed
length of time after testator died); Thorp's Estate, 90 Pitts. (Pa.) L.J. 493 (1942)
(eleven years); In re Smith's Will, 95 Vt. 97, 112 A. 897 (1921) (thirty-five years}.
The fact that the adoption occurred after the effective date of the instrument may
also have helped the court conclude in the following cases that the adoptee was not
within a reference to the adopter's children, issue, etc.: Wallace v. Noland, 246 Ill. 535,
92 N.E. 956 (1910) (twenty-three years); Miller v. Wick,· 311 Ill. 269, 142 N.E.
490 (1924) (five years); Pierce v. Farmers State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 480
(three years); Adams v. Merrill, 45 Ind. App. 315, 85 N.E. I 14, 87 N.E. 36 (1908)
(nineteen years); Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930) (one
year); Savells v. Brown, 187 Ky. 134, 218 S.W. 462 (1920) (thirteen years); Sanders
v. Adams, 278 Ky. 24, 128 S.W. (2d) 223 (1939) (ten years); Clarkson v. Hatton,
143 Mo. 47, 44 S.W. 761 (1898) (twenty-nine years); Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo.
442, 147 S.W. (2d) 660 (1941) (thirty-four years); Melek v. Curators of Univ. of
Missouri, 213 Mo. App. 572, 250 S.W. 614 (1923) (nine years); Parker v. Carpenter,
77 N.H. 453, 92 A. 955 (1915) (three years); Matter of Leask, 197 N.Y. 193, 90
N.E. 652 (1910) (three years); In re Cuddeback's Will, 174 Misc. 322, 20 N.Y.S.
(2d) 862 (1940) (length of time not shown); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1944) 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 180 (thirteen years); Reinhard v. Reinhard, 23 Ohio L.
Abs. 306 (1936) (twenty years); Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867) (ten years);
Corr's Estate, 338 Pa. 337, 12 A. (2d) 76 (1940) (eighteen years); Freeman's Estate
(No. 1~, 40 Pa. Super. 31 (1909) (seventeen years); Ashhurst's Estate, 133 Pa. Super.
526, 3 A. (2d) 218 (1938) (thirty-seven years); Smith v. Bradford, 51 R.I. 289, 154
A. 272 (1931) (three years); Balch v. Johnson, 106 Tenn. 249, 61 S.W. 289 (1901)
(length of time not shown); Cochran v. Cochran, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 95 S.W. 73 I
(1906) (one year); Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N.W. 153 (1909) (nine
years); Mitchell's Will, 157 Wis. 327, 147 N.W. 332 (1914) (five years).
226
Adoptees have been held quite uniformly to be within an instrument's reference to the adopter's statutory heirs or next of kin, even though the adoption occurred
after the instrument became effective. Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E.
602 (1900); Ultz v. Upham, 177 Mich. 351, 143 N.W. 66 (1913); St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W. (2d) 685 (1934); Brock v. Dorman,
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as "a circumstance of controlling importance," 221 and as "a controlling
circumstance." 228 A writer has referred· to it as raising "a grave presumption against an intention to include such adopted child." 229
The authorities, however, are not completely unilateral on this
point. A few cases recognize that the fact that the adoption does not
occur until after the instrument becomes effective has little or no significance as a guide to the intention of the testator or conveyor, whether he
be the adopter 280 or a stranger to the adoption. 231
In Smyth 'V. McKissick 232 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
demonstrated in a striking fashion the remarkable results which can be
produced by attaching to adoption after the effective date of an instrument-that is, to the negative factual situation existing when the instrument became effective-the same degree of significance as is attributed
339 Mo. 611, 98 S.W. (2d) 672 (1936); Trenton Union Trust Co. v. Gane, 125
N.J. Eq. 389, 6 A. (2d) 112 (1939), affirmed 126 N.J. Eq. 273, 8 A. (2d) 708
(1939); Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906); Matter
of Reeker's Estate, 178 Misc. 449, 33 N.Y.S. (2d) 365 (1942); .Smith v. Hunter, 86
Ohio St. 106, 99 N.E. 91 (1912); Laws v. Davis, 34 Ohio App. 157, 170 N.E. 601
(1929); Johnson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 346 (1879); Kohler's Estate, 199 Pa. 455, 49 A.
286 (1901); Dickenson v. Buck, 169 Va. 39, 192 S.E. 748 (1937). Compare, however, as turning on other points, Wooqs v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W. (2d) 680
(1940); Matter,of Kingsbury, 192 App. Div. 206, 182 N.Y.S. 559 (1920), affirmed
230 N.Y. 580, 130 N.E. 901 (1920); Morton v. American Security & T. Co., 251
.App. Div. 31, 295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937), affirmed 276 N.Y. 475, 12 N.E. (2d) 164
(1937); Freeman's Estate (No. 1), 40 Pa. Super. 31 (1909).
227
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61 at 70, 112 A. 689 (1921);
Wildman's Appeal, 111 Coni;i. 683 at 688, 151 A. 265 (1930),
228
Hall v. Crandall, (Del. Ch. 1941). 20 A. ( 2d) 545 at 548.
229
70 A.L.R. 621 at 626 (1931), quoted with approval on this point in In re
Clarke's Estate, 125 Neb. 625 at 632, 251 N.W. 279 (1933).
280
Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Me. 578, 55 A. 520 (1903) (adoption occurred about
eigh~ years after the adopter took out policies of insurance on his life, payable in an event
to his children surviving li.im) ;' Sewall v. Roberts, II5 Mass. 262 (1874) (adoption
occurred forty years after adopter effected the creation of a trust, the corpus of which
was to be paid at his death for the benefit of his child or children).
231 Tirrell v. Bacon, (C.C. Mass. 1880) 3 F. 62; In re Holden, 207 Minn. 2II,
291 N.W. 104 (1940); Haver v. Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, 126 A. 661 (1924);
Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644, 35 A. 882 (1896); In re Truman, 27 R.I. 209, 61 A.
598 (1905). In Wyeth v. Merchant, (D.C. Mo. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 785, affirmed
• (C.C.A. 8th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 242, the fact that the adoption was after the testator's death also appears to be treated as quantitatively neutral; and in O'Brien v. Walker,
35 Haw. 104 (1939), affirmed (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) II5 F. '(2d) .956, cert. denied
312 U.S. 707, 61 S.Ct. 829 (1941), it is referred to as having negative significance,
with less effect than a positive circumstance. See also cases cited in footnote 226, supra,
for the generally accepted view that an adoptee· is to be deemed one of the adopter's
statutory heirs or next of kin within the meaning of a private instrument, even though
the adoption occurs after the effective date of the instrument.
'
282
222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E. (2d) 621 (1943).
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to an affirmative surrounding circumstance, such as the instrument maker's knowledge and approval of the adoption before the instrument became operative. It appeared that by irrevocable trust deeds executed
in 1932. and 1936 and a will executed in 1934, each worded as the
others except as to the property covered, B created trusts of large sums
of money to continue until the death of the survivor of the life beneficiaries, his three daughters and his deceased son's widow ( whose remarriage was to be equivalent to her death for the purposes of the
trusts). A share of the income from each trust was to be paid for life
to each daughter and at her death to her children. Another share was to
be divided in a prescribed way among the widow and children of B's
deceased son, until the widow died or remarried, when the children,
were to take all of the share. The "child or children" of any deceased
child of B's daughters and deceased son were to take the share of the
parent. In event of a complete failure within any class, the other classes
were to take the defaulted share. At the termination of the trusts the
corpus was to be similarly distributed. A child of B's deceased son,
being married but having had no children, adopted A in 1938 and died
in 1941, survived by A but by no blood children. B, who knew and approved of the adoption and treated A as he did his natural great grandchildren, died in 1942.. In a suit for construction of the will and trust
instruments the question was whether A came within the designation of
"child or children" of B's deceased grandson. As to the deeds of trust,
e:ffective before the adoption, A was deemed to be excluded from the
term; as to the will, effective after the adoption and B's knowledge and
approval thereof, A was held to be included in the designation.
And through a process of reasoning essentially similar to that pursued in the McKissick case, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in Mooney v. Tolles, 288 in effect determined that although A,
adopted by a son of the testatrix with her knowledge anll approval
between the making of the will and her death, qualified under other
parts of the will as the child and lawful issue of th_e son, A was not his
lawful issue within the meaning of another clause of the will whereby
the testatrix exercised a power of appointment over certain property, in
its nature ancestral, coming to her under the will of her mother, who
had died before the adoption and by her own testament had empowered
her daughter to appoint the property generally by will, with gift over,
in default of appointment, to the sons of the daughter or their lawful
issue.
288

I II

Conn.

I,

149 A. 515 (1940).
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5. Statutory setting.

In connection with the discussion of the normal or technical meaning of particular words of designation, such as "children," "issue" and
"heirs," and their individual significance with respect to the general
subject of this article, occasion was taken to examine the status-conferring provisions of the adoption statutes, with a view to noting
whether they elevated the adoptee to the status suggested by the term
of designation.234 It was seen that in this respect the adoption statute
might have either an exclusionary or inclusionary force of its own, in so
far as the adoptee and his equivalence were concerned. For the purposes of the discussion it was more or less tacitly assumed that the adoption statute constituted one of the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the language of the instrument, and was to be considered as
such. This was in harmony with the announced attitude of most courts
which have taken the trouble of referring to the point at all. 235 Otherwise stated, it is presumed that the instrument was executed in the light
of knowledge of the then existing adoption law.286 A few courts only
would disregard the adoption statute entirely 237 or openly belittle its
position among the surrounding circumstances.238 There is more common and proper reluctance to attach to the statute, in its relation to the
construction of a private instrument, a presumptively controlling significance in the face of other circumstances which may be felt to be of importance also. 239
284

See supra, II, A.
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Mooney
v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930); Wildman's Appeal~ III Conn. 683, 151
A. 265 (1930); Hall v. Crandall, (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545; Wallace v.
Noland, 246 Ill. 535, 92 N.E. 956 (1910); Munie v. Gruenwald, 289 Ill. 468, 214
N.E. 605 (1919); In re McEwan, 128 N.J., Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940); Lichter
v. Thiers, 1f9 Wis. 481, 121 N.W. 153 (1909).
286
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Ansonia
Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588 (1927); Mooney v. Tolles, III
Conn. I, 149 A. 515 (1930); Wildman's Appeal, II I Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 (1930);
Munie v. Gruenwald, 289 Ill. 468, 124 N.E. 605 (1919); Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind.
App. 432, 54 N.E. 446, 55 N.E. 510 (1899); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336
Mo. 17, 76 S.W. (2d) 685 (1934); Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W. (2d)
660 (1941); Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644, 35 A. 882 (1896); Smith v. Bradford,
51 R.I. 289, 154 A. 272 (1931); Dickenson v. Buck, 169 Va. 39, 192 S.E. 748
(1937).
237
See Puterbaugh's Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 126 A. 254 (1924).
288
Miller v. Wick, 311 Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924); Wilder v. Butler, 116
Me. 389, 102 A. 110 (1917).
289
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Wildman's Appeal, I I I Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 .(1930); Dulfon v. Keasbey, II I N.J. Eq.
235
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Change in the statutory setting.-When the instrument is executed
or becomes effective the statutory setting, so far as adoption is concerned,
may be a complete void or be otherwise materially different from the
statutory situation which prevails at a later date when identification of
persons designated by the instrument is to be made. If this is the case
three distinct problems may arise.
First, there may be a question whether, as a matter of statutory construction, the new law was intended by the legislature to apply with respect to instruments previously executed or effective. The answer is
sometimes expressly given by the statute itself.240
Second, if the changed law is in fact applicable as to the anterior
, instrument, the statute may be unconstitutional as disturbing interests
which hav~ already sprung up under the instrument. Thus, where a
will, executed and probated at a time when adoption was unknown to
the jurisprudence of the state, left the residuary ~sets to the testator's
son, but provided that if the son should die leaving no issue the property should pass to another son, it was said that if a subsequently enacted
adoption statute were construed to have the effect of qualifying a child,
adopted thereunder by the first son, as "issue" within the meaning of
the will, the statute would be unconstitutional as violating a provision
of the bill of rights declaring retrospective laws to be oppressive and
unjust. 241 On the other hand, the absence of vested interests under the
instrument may eliminate constitutional obstacles to retrospective
laws.242
•
Third, a problem as to the construction of the instrument itself is
suggested: Does the negative statutory situation prevailing when an
instrument was executed or became effective dictate that a term of
designation therein employed, which then woul!f not have embraced
an adoptee, shall be deemed to exclude him still at a subsequent date of
distribution, where a statute enacted in the meantime has elevated an
adoptee to the status of one answering the description of the term. of
designation?
If the instrument-maker deliberately or with indifference cast the
223, 162 A. 102 (1932); Smith v. Bradford 51 R.I. 289, 154 A. 272 (1931);
Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N.W. 153 (1909).
240
See, for example, the statute affecting adoption involved in In re Burns, 15 Pa.
Dist. & Co. 615 (1931).
241
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.H. 407, 14 A. 557 (1887). Accord: Schafer v.
Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867).
242
Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602 (1900); Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906); In re Burns, 15 Pa. Dist. & Co.
615 (1931).
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determination of the takers upon the law as it might stand at the later
date, it seems clear that the circumstance of the original statutory setting should not be treated as significant. Thus, the courts are agreed
that reference in an instrument to a person's heirs or next of kin, expressly or impliedly to be ascertained according to the law at the date
of the person's future death, embraces one whom he adopts pursuant to
a subsequent statute making an adoptee an heir or distributee of the
adopter. 248 And by the same'token, it has been held that under a provision in favor of a person's next of kin, in a deed of trust effective before the enactment of a statute withdrawing from an adoptee the right
to inherit from his natural relatives, a sister of the person mentioned
could not take as his next of kin, where she was adopted before his
death by a stranger, even though the adoption occurred before the
change in the law. 244
The weight of authority is to the effect, however, that if the instrument reveals no such inclination to let the law take its course, but employs a term of description such as "children" or "issue," which at the
time the instrument is executed and becomes effective has a meaning
exclusive of adoptees, the fact that by subsequent statute an adoptee is
elevated to the status of a child or issue of the adopter will not alter
the exclusionary force of the designation as it was used in the instrument.245 The soundness of giving this much weight to the original
negative situation has been doubted for the reason that, whether the
designation be "heirs" or "childr~n" or "issue," the reference is usually
to a class whose membership is left to future determination.246 And a
few decisions, eitl).er stressing the absence of constitutional objections
248 Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602 (1900); Gilliam v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906); Kemp v. N.Y. Produce Exchange,
34 App. Div. 175, 54 N.Y.S. 678 (1898}; U.S. Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150 App. Div.
621, 135 N.Y.S. 849 (1912); Smith v. Hunter, 86 Ohio St. 106, 99 N.E. 91 (1912).
See also Trenton Union Trust Co. v. Gane, 125 N.J. Eq. 389, 6 A. (2d) 112 (1939),
affirmed 126 N.J. Eq. 273, 8 A. (2d) 708 (1939); U.S. Trust Co. v. Hoyt, II5 Misc.
663, 190 N.Y.S. 166 (1915), affimed 173 App. Div. 930, 158 N.Y.S. 1133 (1916),
affirmed 223 N.Y. 616, II9 N.E. 1083 (1918); Kohler's Estate, 199 Pa. 455, 49 A.
286 (1901).
'
244
In re Burns, 15 Pa. Dist & Co. 615 (1931).
245 Wyeth v. Merchant, (D.C. Mo. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 785, affirmed (C.C.A. 8th,
1941) 120 F. (2d) 242; Wallace v. Noland, 246 Ill. 535, 92 N.E. 956 (1910);
Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W. (2d) 660 (1941); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64
N.H. 407, 14 A. 557 (1887); Stout v. Cook, 77 N.J. Eq. 153, 75 A. 583 (1910),
for other reasons reversed in part, 79 N.J. Eq. 573, 81 A. 821 (19u), and affirmed in
part, 79 N.J. Eq. 640, 81 A. 824 (19n). And see Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App.
198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932); Reinhard v. Reinhard, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 306 (1936);
Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867); Ashhurst's Estate, 133 Pa. Super. 526, 3 A. (2d)
218 (1938).
246 Kales, "Rights of Adopted Children," 9 ILL. L. REv. 149 at 172 (1914).
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in the particular case, or without discussing the matter at all, in effect
have treated as insignificant the fact that no adoption statute existed
at the execution and effective date of an instrument which conferred
benefits upon a person's children or issue, determinable at a future
time.m The argument in favor of looking to the.adoption laws at the
time of distribution rather than at an earlier date appears to rest on the
hypothesis that the testator or conveyor had no specific intent in the
matter, but did have a general intent that all qualifying as members of
the class at the time of distribution should be regarded as included.
There is some tendency in this, however, to overlook the definitional
aspects of the description employed. These might reasonably be conceived as fixed as of the execution of the instrument or as of its effective
date. The maker of the instrument may have anticipated changes in the
number of units constituting the whole, but. not have contemplated
changes in the nature of the units themselves.

III.
RESORT TO POLICY, PARTICULAR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION AND
EXPRESS STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS

A. In General
So far the discussion has centered largely around surface manifestations of the instrument-maker's "intention"-the particular terms
of designation he employed, the accompanying language, and the surrounding circumstances. These are factors, however, which may not
and often do not furnish any adequate answer to the inquiry. It could
hardly be otherwise, since the inquiry for which answer is sought is
ordinarily with reference to a matter the testa!or or his counterpa_rt
did not foresee; namely, an adoption after execution of the instrument.
It then becomes necessary for the court to resort to other sources for its
conclusion. A fundamental source is public policy,248 as that may be
247
Tirrell v. Bacon, (C.C. Mass. 1880) 3 F. 62 (will was executed before, but
testator died after enactment of statute, under which his son adopted a child) ; Sewall
v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262 (1874) (trust indenture became effective before adoption
statute was enacted under which settlor adopted a child); Von Beck v. Thomsen, 44
App. Div. 373, 60 N.Y.S. 1094 (1899), affirmed 167 N.Y. 601, 60 N.E. 1121
( 1901) (policies of insurance were issued before adoption statute was enacted under
which insured adopted a child, but insured died after enactment of statute). In Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644, 35 A. 882 (1896), no adoption statute existed when the
will was executed, but codicils were added and the will was republished after enactment
of the adoption law.
248
See Simes, Knouff, and Leonard, "Meaning of 'Heirs' in Willir-A Suggestion
in Legal Method," 31 M1cH. L. REv. 356 (1933). In 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§ 243 (1940) the practical equivalent of policy is stated in terms of "constructional
preferences."
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conceived by the court. The policy may not he announced in direct
terms,- however; as it appears in the opinion of a court it may take the
form of one or more of the so-called "rules of construction." Rules of
construction are often mutually conflicting and thus reflect the underlying struggle of elep1.ents more basic. When a conclusion has been
reached, consciously or unconsciously, on the basis of policy, there is
generally no difficulty in locating a rule of construction to support the
decision, even though the rule itself may be mere window~dressing
and not necessarily expressive of the controlling policy. Of course, once
a rule of construction has been announced for a particular type of case,
courts may later resort to it automatically as a basis of decision in itself.
This saves the court's time. It abbreviates the judicial process. In a
word, it is a convenience.
Policy in favor of probable intent.-While professing not to remake
instruments, there can be no question but that courts constantly pursue a
policy of filling gaps left by the instrument-maker in accordance with
what they deem would have been his probable intention if he had
thought about the omitted matter.249 A guide to what his intention
probably would have been is logically to be found in the usual intention
entertained by other persons in a similar situation.250 Unfortunately
there is no infallible means of laying hold of this yardstick. A court
may have to do a lot of guessing with respect to it.
Where the question is whether a person related to another by adoption only is within an instrument's designation of the latter's children,
issue or like relatives, and the problem cannot be resolved successfully
by resort to the language and surrounding circumstances, the guess of
the court may be that the usual intention of persons similarly situated
would be to exclude the adoptee. This assumption may then be stated
in the form of a rule of construction that in cases of doubt the presumption of law is in favor of those in the line of ancestral blood,251 or that
blood relationship is always recognized as a potent factor in testacy,252
GRAY, NATURE AND SouRcEs oF THE LAw, §§ 702-703 (1909).
3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 243 (1940).
251
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, I 12 A. 689 (1921); Grundmann v. Wilde, 346 Mo. 327, 141 S.W. (2d) 778 (1940); N.Y. Life Ins. & T. Co. v.
Viele, 161 N.Y. II, 55 N.E. 3II (1899); Matter of Haight, 63 Misc. 624, II8
N.Y.S. 745 (1909). See also dissenting opinions in Mooney v. Tolles, III Conn. I,
149 A. 515 (1930), and Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N.E. 446, 55 N.E.
510 (1899).
252
Hall v. Crandall, (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545; Woodcock's Appeal, 103
Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907); Wilder v. Butler, II6 Me. 389, 102 A. IIO (1917);
Dulfon v. Keasbey, III N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932).
249
250
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or that there is a presumption in favor of keeping the property in the
channel of natural descent.258
If the court conceives that the desires of the usual testator are for
equality among persons of corresponding position, a reason for excluding an adoptee from a particular designation may lie in the fact that if
he were included he would obtain a greater share than others,254 as
might be the case where, having been adopted by one of his natural
grandparents, he claimed under the latter's will both as a child and a
grandchild.255 The constructional preference in favor of equality of
distribution might conceivably be extended in the opposite direction to
furnish reason for holding that an adoptee should be deemed a child or
other representative of the adopter and his line, where there is no other
representative and the result of failure of the line will be to add to the
shares of others. This, however, was precisely the situation in most of
the cases examined, but in none of them was the preference for equality
of distribution mentioned as a factor to be considered in the adoptee's
favor. 256 Slightly more helpful to him has been the concept that most
testators mean to dispose of all their property and avoid a partial intestacy, so that where such an intestacy would have resulted if the
adoptee had not been included within a designation, he has sometimes
been deemed within it. 257
Policy of public interest.-No one can read the cases on this subject
without soon becoming aware of what for the most part is an unexpressed but nonetheless perceptible attitude of fear on the part of
the courts that, unless they guard well against it, the institution of adop258
Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E. (2d} 420 (1942); Everitt v. LaSpeyre,
195 Ga. 377, 24 S.E. (2d) 381 (1943); In re Clarke's Estate, 125 Neb. 625, 251
N.W. 279 ( 1933).
254
Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 17 A. (2d) 517 (1941); Adrian
v. Koch, 83 N.J. Eq. 484, 91 A. 123 (1914), affirmed 84 N.J. Eq. 195, 93 A. 1083
(1915) i Matter of Hopkins, 102 App. Div. 458, 92 N.Y.S. 463 (1905); Einstein v.
Michaelson, 107 Misc. 661, 177 N.Y.S. 474 (1919); Matter of Cotheal's Estate, 121
Misc. 665, 202 N.Y.S. 268 (1923).
255
See Adrian v. Koch, 83 N.J. Eq. 484, 91 A. 123 (1914), affirmed 84 N.J.
Eq. 195, 93 A. 1083 (1915); Einstein v. Michaelson, 107 Misc. 661, 177 N.Y.S. 474
(1919); Matter of Cotheal's Estate, 121 Misc. 665, 202 N.Y.S. 268 (1923).
256
In Mooney v. Tolles, I I I Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930), the equality of distribution argument in favor of the adoptee was based more on the context than on an abstract rule of construction. See also Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744,
136 A. 588 (1927).
257
Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588 (1927); Munie v.
Gruenwald, 289 Ill. 468, 124 N.E. 605 (1919). But compare, for example, Huxley
v. Security Trust Co., (Del. Ch. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 679, where the adoptee was excluded as a "child" or "issue" of the testator's daughter, although this resulted in a
partial intestacy.
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tion may be an implement of self-advancement, fraud or spite in the
hands of adopters seeking to use it deliberately to meet requirements of
an instrument, such as a will, that the adopters have children. There
has been some basis for this fear in the facts of a few of the cases.
The danger to which reference has just been made is doubtless most
real where the adopter himself, as distinguished from the adoptee, will
benefit if the conditions with respect to his having children can be.1met
-by him. It is thought there is significance in the fact, therefore, that in
no instance where an instrumt:;nt ·gave to a person a restricted estate,
which would ripen into a larger one if he should have children, did the
court permit the increase in his interest and the defeat of the gift over
to be accomplished through an adoption. So where a testator's nephew
was to receive a third of the income from a trust for life or until he
should have a child that should attain the age of three years, and in the
latter event he was to receive a third of the principal, the COUft held
that, having no natural children, he did not qualify for the corpus share,
although he and his wife took a child of about six months into their
household approximately a year after the testator died, and adopted the
child three years later.258 And there is authority that one given a fee
simple estate, defeasible in event of his death without children or issue,
could not by subsequent adoption acquire an absolute estate and avoid
the executory limitation259 The possibility of the use of adoption for
ulterior purposes in such a case is illustrated by Nickerson v. H oover.260
There the testator had devised real estate to his daughter, "provided
she have [children]," and if she did not, the property was to pass at her
death to her husband for life and then be sold and the proceeds distributed among the testator's children and grandchildren. When the
will was executed the testator's daughter was only thirty years old,
although she had been married for nine years without having had
children. Forty-eight years after the testator's death his daughter, then
eighty-two years old, adopted an adult married woman as her chiJd and
heir. The court had no hesitancy in holding that the adoption did not
ripen the daughter's estate into an absolute fee and defeat .the gift over
conditioned on her death without children.
If, as is the usual case,. the adopter has a life estate only, but his
258

Miller v. Wick, 3II Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924).
Wallace v. Noland, 246 Ill. 535, '92 N.E. 956 (1910); :Nickerson v. Hoover,
70 Ind. App. 343, II5 N.E. 588 (i917); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.H. 407, 14 A..
557 (1887). See also Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930);
Love v. Love, 179 N.C. II5, 101 S.E. 562 (1919); Cochran v. Cochran, 43 Tex. Civ.
App. 259, 95 S.W. 731 (1906). ,
,
260
70 Ind. App. 343, II5 ~.E. 588 (1917).
259
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children, issue or other relatives are to take the remainder, with gift
over to others if he die without children, etc., then the chances of
direct personal gain to the adopter are not great, even if adopted children should qualify as takers within the meaning of the will. In this
situation, however, courts seem moved by a fear that if they should
recognize adoptees as qualifying under the will to take the remainder,
the life tenant might adopt a child simply to defeat the gift over to
others. Hence it has sometimes been denied that by the process of
adoption a life tenant, having no power to convey the fee, could in effect
exercise a power of appointment over it and thereby defeat the ulterior
limitation.261 Commenting on the facts involved in cases it sought to
distinguish, on~ court observed that the adoption involved in them had
often taken place under circumstances savoring of an attempt to create
an heir for purposes of defeating a gift over.262 In New Zealand the
Supreme Court said that in the absence of a proviso in the adoption
statute rendering adoptions ineffective as to instruments previously
executed, "It would not be difficult to imagine a case where an adoption might be proceeded with for the sole purpose of altering the destination of property already affected by deed, will or other instrument." 268
The situation is especially suspect if the adoption occurs a short time
before the adopter dies,264 or if the adoptee is an adult.265
261
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, II2 A. 689 (1921); Woods
v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675; 142 S.W. (2d) 680 (1940); Reinders v. Koppelman, 94 Mo.
338, 7 S.W. 288 (1887); Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47, 44 S.W. 761 (1898); Melek
v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 213 Mo. App. 572, 250 S.W. 614 (1923); In re
Clarke's Estate, 125 Neb. 625, 251 N.W. 279 (1933); Matter of Leask, 197 N.Y.
193, 90 N.E. 652 (1910). But compare Brock v. Dorman, 339 Mo. 6n, 98 S.W.
(2d) 672 (1936). In Corr's Estate, 338 Pa. 337, 12 A. (2d) 76 (1940), and Freeman's Estate {No. 1), 40 Pa. Super. 31 (1909), a life tenant having power to appoint
the remainder among his or her children (Corr case) or kin (Freeman case) was held to
be without power to appoint the fee to his or her adult adoptee.
262
Mooney v. Tolles, III Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930).
268
In re Beatty, Beatty v. Beatty, [1939] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 954 at 955. In Ashhurst's Estate, 32 Pa. Dist. & Co. 547 at 548 (1938), affirmed 133 Pa. Super. 526, 3
A. (2d) 218, the court said: "It is easy to see the abuses which might arise if childless
persons unable to have children could, by adopting children, defeat the rights of others
and in effect divert the estate of the testator to persons who were strangers to his intention."
26
' Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, II2 A. 689 (1921) (fact that
the adoption was a few days before adopter's death was said by the court to be of controlling significance); Tankersley v. Davis, 195 N.C. 542, 142 S.E. 765 (1928) (the
court said it was perhaps significant that the adoption by the life tenant had taken place
only eight days before her death). See also Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867), in
which it appeared that the last of three children adopted by the life tenant was
adopted one day before she died.
265
See Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W. (2d) 680 (1940); Corr's
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The possibility of the use of adoption for avaricious or spiteful purposes cannot be denied. The probability of its employment for those
ends is believed, however, to be 'slight under modern adoption statutes
contemplating a thorough investigation into such matters as the motives of the prospective adopter. It should be time enough to speculate
upon possible fraudulent use of adoption when the fraud is found. And
in considering policies involving the public interest, a court ought not
overlook any which may be manifested by the legislature in placing
adopted children on a level with natural children "to all intents and
purposes."

•

B. Special Rules of Construction or Presumption
Express statutory presumptions
In -the United States the legislatures have exerted little effort to
provide a direct answer to the question whether one related to another
by adoption is to be deemed the equivalent of a natural relative within
the intendment of a private instrument.266 In the British Empire greater
strides in this direction have been made. One of the advantages of an
explicit statutory guide lies in the circumstance that it can be made to fit
into broader legislative policy with respect to adoption generally. Since,
however, any rule which might be laid down by statute in the present
connection would be desirable only in the form of a rebuttable presumption, lest rigidity be introduced into a matter in which :flexibility is
demanded, the statute would have to leave the question to some extent
in the lap of the courts, where for the most part it already is.
Such express statutory provi~ions as do exist vary greatly from
eac:4 other. At least :five distinct approaches to the problem are found,
sometimes in partial combination. A statute may undertake (a) to prevent the defeat, through adoption, of a limitation over to others conditioned upon the adopter's dying without children; (b) to eliminate
adoption as a factor in the interpretation of instruments executed before
the adoption; ( c) to declare an adoptee to be equivalent to a child of
the adopter within the meaning of an instrument, irrespective of who
its maker was; ( d) to declare an adoptee not to be equivalent to a child
of the adopter within the meaning of an instrument, irrespective of who
its maker was; and ( e) to declare an adoptee to be equivalent or not
I.

Estate, 338 Pa. 337, 12 A. (2d) 76 (1940); Freeman's Estate (N~. 1), 40 Pa. Super.

31 (1909).
266
As to the possibility that the status-conferring provisions of the adoption statutes
impliedly raise a rule of presumption, see supra, II, A, 2.
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equivalent to a child of the adopter within the meaning of an instrument, depending upon whether it was the adopter or another person
who executed the instrument.
(a) A statute of the first type, preventing the defeat of a limitation
over conditioned on the adopter's dyit;1-g without children, is found in
New York, where it is provided:
"As respects the passing and limitation over of real or personal property dependent under the provisions of any instrument
on the foster parent dying without heirs, the foster child is not
deemed the child of the foster parent so as to defeat the rights of
remaindermen." 267
It will be seen that while this provision covers any instrument,268
its sole purpose is to prevent the defeat of the rights of "remaindermen." 269 Accordingly, it has no application to a case of a substitutionary
gift, in event of the foster parent dying without "heirs," which does not
involve futurity but takes effect, if at all, immediately upon the death
of a testator. 210 Moreover, there must be an actual gift over in default
of such "heirs." Consequently, the provision does not apply to a conveyance for the benefit of one for life, then to her heirs at law.271 The
gift over to other remaindermen need not be expressed, however, if it
can be fairly implied. 212 And such remaindermen may be those entitled
to the residuary estate.273 The reference to the foster parent's death
without "heirs," being unintelligible if taken literally, has been treated
as meaning death without children 274 or, possibly, issue 275 or descendN.Y. Domestic Relations Law (McKinney, 1941) § u5.
As originally enacted the provision referred only to deeds, conveyances, wills,
devises and trusts. N.Y. Laws, 1887, c. 703. Accordingly, in Von Beck v. Thomsen, 44
App. Div. 373, 60 N.Y.S. 1094 (1899), affirmed 167 N.Y. 601, 60 N.E. u21
(1901), the court held that the provision had no application to policies of life insurance, the proceeds of which were payable at tlie insured's death to his wife or, if she
died before him, to their children.
269
In Matter of Nelson's Estate, 143 Misc. 843, 258 N.Y.S. 667 (1932), the
court said that in the absence of this provision, where the passing of property by limitation over might be dependent upon the parent dying without children, it would be
easy for a person having no children to adopt one and thus cut off the contingent
remainder. The provision in question is aimed at that possibility.
270
Matter of Horn, 256 N.Y. 294, 176 N.E. 399 (1931).
271
Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906).
272
Matter of Marsh's Will, 143 Misc. 609, 257 N.Y.S. 514 (1932).
278
Matter of Leask, 197 N.Y. 193, 90 N.E. 652 (1910).
274
Matter of Leask, 197 N.Y. 193, 90 N.E. 652 (1910); Matter of Hopkins,
102 App. Div. 458, 92 N.Y.S. 463 (1905); Matter of Nelson's Estate, 143 Misc. 843,
258 N.Y.S. 667 (1932).
275
See N.Y. Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Viele, 161 N.Y. II, 55 N.E. 311 {1899);
267
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ants.276 It is not clear whether, in directing that the adoptee shall not be
deemed to be a child of the foster parent so as to defeat a limitation over
to remaindermen, the statute is to be interpreted as excluding him also
from taking under the limitation over itself, as where it is to the foster
parent's heirs or next of kin according to New York intestacy laws. 277
Although the New York statutory provision, supra, does not state
expressly that it is to have presumptive effect only, no reason is apparent for believing that the rule which it prescribes could not be overcome by adequate evidence of an intention in conflict with it.
(b) Statutory provisions of the second type, presumptively eliminating adoption as a factor in the interpretation of instruments executed
prior to the adoption, have been enacted in Pennsylvania 278 and parts of
the British Empire.279 In New South Wales the statute declares:
Matter of Hoyt's Estate, 120 Misc. 188, 197 N.Y.S. 828 (1923); Morton v. American Security & T. Co., 251 App. Div. 31, 295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937), affirmed N.Y. 475,
12 N.E. (2d) 164 (1937).
276
See Matter of Marsh's Will, 143 Misc. 609, 257 N.Y.S. 514 (1932).
277
That the adoptee may so take: U.S. Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150 App. Div. 621,
135 N.Y.S. 849 (1912). That he may not, because otherwise the purpose of the
statute would be defeated: Morton v. American Security & T. Co., 251 App. Div. 31,
295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937), affirmed 276 N.Y. 475, 12 N.E. (2d) 164 (1937).
278
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) tit, 20, § 228. This provision applies only to
wills executed by persons other than the adopter, and it is stated in the converse form;
that is, an adoptee is to be deemed within a reference to the adopter's unnamed child or
' children in a will of another than the adopter, if the adoptee was adopted before the
date of the will. In a note to the section of the statute by the commission to revise and
codify the law of decedents' estates it is said that an extension of the provisions of the
section to include children adopted after the date of the will by one other than the
testator would tenq to defeat the testator's intention. The section applies only to wills
and not, for example, to a trust deed. Thorp's Estate, 90 Pitts. (Pa.) L.J. 493 (1942).
It has been suggested that it would not apply where the term of designation in the will
was "issue" rather than "children." Ashhurst's Estate, 133 Pa. Super. 526, 3 A. (2d)
218 (1938).
279
Ont. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 218, § 6 (expressions "child," "children" and
"issue" in any instrument made by the adopter after an adoption are, unless contrary
intention appears, 'to include an adopted child or children and issue -of an adopted
child, unless the contrary intention appears); N.S. Wales Stat., 1939, p. 257; N.Z.
8onsol. Stat. (1908) vol. 2, p. 835 (adoptee not to acquire any right, title or interest
in any property which would devolve on any child of the adopter by virtue of any in. strument prior to the date of the order of adoption, unless it is expressly so stated in the
instrument); Queens. Pub. Acts (Reprint, 1936) vol. 1, pp. 725-726 (adoption not to
affect any estate, right or interest in any property to which a person has become entitled mediately or immediately in possession, expectancy or conting~ncy by virtue of any
disposition made before the adoption order);. S. Austr. Stat. (Reprint, 1936) vol. 1, p.
145 (adoptee not to acq~ire any right or title in any property which would devolve
on any child of the adopter by virtue of any instrument executed or made prior to the
date of the order of adoption, unless it is expressly so stated in the instrument). Under
the New Zealand provision, supra, the reference to "any instrument prior to the date
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"Provided always that such adopted child shall not by such
adoption ... acquire any right, title, or interest in any property
under any deed, will, or instrument whatsoever made or executed
prior to the date of such order of adoption unless it is expressly so
stated in such deed, will, or instrument." 280
( c) Statutory provisions of the third type, declaring an adoptee to
be equivalent to a child of the adopter within the meaning of an instrument, and making no distinction between a case where the instrument
was executed by the adopter and where it was executed by a stranger to
the adoption, are found in Alberta,281 Prince Edward Island,282
Quebec,283 and Saskatchewan,284 the statute of the latter jurisdiction
providing:
"The word 'child' or its equivalent in any instrument shall include an adopted child unless the contrary plainly appears by the
terms of the instrument."
The Washington statute is possibly subject to classification within
this group also, as far as wills are concerned.285 And in North Dakota a
portion of the Civil Code relating to definitions and general provisions
states that the term "children" includes children by birth and by adoption. 286 This may have reference, however, only to the meanjng of the
quoted word as employed in statutes.
of such order of adoption" has been construed to refer to an instrument executed prior
to the adoption. In re a Dead of Trust, Peddle v. Beattie, [ 193 3]. N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 696
(dictum); In re Horiana Kingi, Thompson v. Eruiti Tamahau Kingi, [1937] N.Z.L.R.
(S.C.) 1025 (dictum}; ln re Beatty, Beatty v. Beatty, [1939] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 954.
lf the adoption is after the execution of the will, even though before execution of
a codicil and confirmation of the will in the codicil, the adoptee is excluded as a taker,
where the codicil in no way refers to the dispositive provisions of the will under which
the adoptee claims. In re Jackson, Holmes v. Public Trustee, [1942] N.Z.L.R.
(S.C. & C.A.) 682. For a criticism of this holding, see 19 N.Z.L.J. 152-153 (1943).
280
N.S. Wales Stat., 1939, p. 257.
281
Alta. Rev. Stat. (1942) c. 300, § 48.
282
P.E.I. Stat., 1940, c. 12, § 126.
288
In Quebec it is provided that the word "child" or its equivalent in a deed
shall include also an adopted child unless the contrary clearly appears; except that "it
shall not include the adopted child when it relates to a substitution in which the
adopter's own children are the institutes or substitutes." Que. Rev. Stat. (1941) c.
324, § 21.
284
Sask. Rev. Stat. ( I 940) c. 278, § 86.
285
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1943) § 1699-13. This section declares in
part that by the decree of adoption the adoptee shall be, to all intents and purposes, and
for all legal incidents, the child, legal heir, and lawful issue of the adopter, and entitled to all the rights and privileges, including "the right to take under testamentary
disposition," of a child of the adopter begotten in lawful wedlock.
286
N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 7284.
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( d) Statutory provisions of the fourth type, in effect declaring an
adoptee not to be equivalent to a child of the adopter within the meaning of an instrument, irrespective of whether the maker of the instrument was the adopter or a stranger to the adoption, have been enacted
for England and Wales 287 and Scotland.288 The Adoption of Children
Act, 1926, applicable to England and Wales, provides in part:
". . . and the expressions 'child,' 'children' and 'issue' where
used in any disposition, whether made before or after the making
of the adoption order, shall not, unless the contrary intention appears, include an adopted child . . . or the issue of an adopted
child....
"For the purposes of this section 'disposition' means an assurance of any interest in property by any instrument whether inter
vivos or by will including codicil." 280
( e) Statutory provisions of the fifth type, declaring an adoptee to
be equivalent or not equivalent to a child of the adopter within the
meaning of an instrument, depending respectively upon whether it was
executed by the adopter or a stranger to the adoption, are found, sometimes in conjunction with a prov1sion which distinguishes between the
cases of adoption before and after the execution of the instrument, in
Maryland, 200 Massachusetts,201 Pennsylvania,202 and parts of the British
Empire.293 The protoype legislation in Massachusetts provides:
287

l 6 & l 7 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 5 ( 2) ( Adoption of Children Act,, 1926) .
20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 37, § 5 (3) (Adoption of Children Act), (Scotland).
289
16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 5(2) (4) (1926).
·
290
Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 16, § 83. This section provides that the
term "child" or its equivalent in a deed, grant, will or other instrument shall be held
to include any child adopted "by the person executing the same," unless the contrary
plainly appears by the terms thereof, whether such instrument be executed before or
after the adoption. The implication would seem to be that the converse presumption
applies where the instrument was executed by one other than the adopter. See, as apparently to this effect, Eureka Life Ins. Co. v. Geis, 121 Md. 196, 88 A. 158 (1913).
291
Mass. Ann-. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 210, § 8.
292
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 20, §§ 227, 228. These sections refer to
wills only. Section 227 declares that whenever in a will a bequest or devise shall be
made to the child or children of the testator, without naming such child or children,
such bequest or devise shall be construed -to include any adopted child or children of
the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will. Section 228 is a similar
provision with respect to the case where the will is executed by one other than the
testator, but the presumption of inclusion of the adopted child in such a case is stated
to apply only as to adoptions occurring before the date of the will.
293
Br. CoL Rev. Stat. ( l 9 36) c. 6, § l 2 ( word "child" or "issue" or its equivalent, in a will, grant, or settlement is to include a child adopted "by the testator,
grantor, or settlor," unless the contrary plainly appears by the terms of the instrument);
Ont. Rev. Stat.. (1937). c. 218, § 6 (expressions "child," "children" and "issue" in an
instrument "made after the making of the adoption order by the adopting parent" are
to include an adoptee, but not in any other case); Nova Scotia Rev. Stat. (1923)
288

1 945]

CoNSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS

93 1

"The word 'child,' or its equivalent, in a grant, trust settlement, entail, devise or bequest shall include a child adopted by the
settlor, grantor or testator, unless the_ contrary plainly appears by
the terms of the instrument; but if the settlor, grantor or testator
is not hi~self the adopting parent, the child by adoption shall not
have, under such instrument, the rights of a child born in lawful
wedlock to the adopting parent, unless it plainly appears to have
been the intention of the settlor, grantor or testator to include an
adopted child." 294
This provision was said to have been passed as a probable consequence
of the decision in Sewall v. Roberts,295 which held an adoptee to be a
child and issue of the adopter within the meaning of a trust agreement
effected by the adopter through the agency of his father's administrators. There being no precise equivalent for the word "child," the
statutory presumption in question has been construed to mean that if by
a settlement, deed or will property is given by terms which embrace
a child born in lawful wedlock, and which, in their applisation to existing facts, have the same effect and mean the same thing as child or
children, such as the terms "issue," "descendant" or "heir at law," the
statutory provision is applicable to exclude a person's adoptee as a taker
within such terms under an instrument executed by a stranger to the
adoption. 206
Other statutory rules.-The statutory provision found in some
jurisdictions, to the effect that an adopted child shall not be capable of
taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the body of the adopter,
has been discussed at an earlier point, where the conclusion was reached
that logically such a provision relates only to inheritance or to the acquisition of certain statutory interests created in lieu of estates tail.201
In this connection it may be observed that by amendment the Ohio
adoption statute, after its declaration with respect to the incapacity of an
c. 139, § 8 (expression "child" or its equivalent in a grant, trust, settlement, entail,
devise, or bequest is to include an adopted child of tji.e settlor, grantor or testatoI, unless
the contrary plainly appears by the terms of the instrument; but the opposite is to be
true where the settlor, grantor or testator is not the adopter); Queens. Pub. Acts (Reprint, 1936} vol. 1, p. 726 (adoptee not to have any right to property under any
disposition made by a person other than the adopter, unless the contrary appears to
have been the intention of the person making the disposition.)
294
•
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 210, § 8.
295
Sewall v. Roberts, II5 Mass. 262 (1874).
296
Wyeth v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441, l l N.E. 729 (1887); Blodgett v. Stowell,
189 Mass. 142, 75 N.E. 138 (1905); Walcott v. Robinson, 214 Mass. 172, 100 N.E.
1109 (1913); Gallagher v. Sullivan, 251 Mass. 552, 146 N.E. 769 (1925); Hutchins
v. Browne, 253 Mass. 55, 147 N.E. 899 (1925); Bundy v. United States Trust Co.,
257 Mass. 72, 153 N.E. 337 (1926).
297
'
See supra, II, A, 5.
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adoptee to, "inherit" property expressly limited to the heirs of the body
of the adopter, provides that the adoptee shall, however, be capable of
"inheriting'' property expressly limited by will or by operation of law
to the chil,d or children, heir or heirs at law, or next of kin, of the adopting parent or parents, or to a class including any of the foregoing. 298
Also encounterep. occasionally is an adoption statute which declares
that its enactment is not to affect dispositions by an instrument effective
before a stated date.299 Such provisions, however, are in the nature of
saving clauses and throw no particular light on the prqblems under
consideration.
It will have been observed that all of the express statutory presumptions which have been discussed relate to the equivalence of an adoptee as
a child or similar relative of the adopter. Only one statute has been
found which explicitly provides a presumption with respect to whether a
child, after his adoption by a stranger, is still to be deemed a child or
issue of the natural parents within the meaning of an instrument. A
Queensland law declares that he shall continue so to be deemed, notwithstanding his adoption by another person, unless a contrary intention on the part of the maker of the instrument appears. 800
'
2. Judicial presumptions depending upon who executes instrument
A previously discussed type of express statutory presumption, which
makes an adoptee's equivalence or nonequivalence to a child within the
intendment of an instrument depend upon whether the maker of the
instrument was the adopter or another person, has its analogue in rules
of construction developed by courts themselves. One· of these is that
where a person makes provision for his own "child or children," by that
designation, he will be deemed to have intended that a child adopted by
him should be included, unless a contrary intention is established by
appropriate evidence.301 There is no dispute over this rule, nor does it
298

Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Supp. 1943) § 10512-23.
See, for example, N.Y. Domestic Relations Law (Supp. 1943) § I 10.
800
Queens. Pub. Acts (Reprint, 1936) vol. 1, p. 726.
801
For various expression of this rule of construction see Middletown Trust Co. v.
Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 149 A.
515 (1930); Wildman's Appeal, 111 Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 (1930); Casper v.
Helvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N.E. 123 (1925); Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App.
463, 192 N.E. 899 (1934); Woodcock's Appeal, 103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1'907);
Wilder v. Butler, 116 Me. 389, 102 A. IIO (1917); Dulfon v. Keasbey, III N.J. Eq.
223, 162 A. 102 (1932); In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940);
Albright v. Albright, i16 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760 (1927); Rodgers v. Miller, 43
Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932); Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 1.21 N.W.
I 53 ( 1909). For instances where the presumption, if its existence was considered at
all, was overthrown by the context or circumstances, see Warden v. Overman, 155 Iowa
1, 13,5 N.W. 649 (1912); Morrison v. Sessions, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249 (1888);
299
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appear that there should be any. Suggestions, however, that its basis is
a moral obligation owed by the adopter to the adoptee are rather superficial.802 A simpler and sounder basis would appear to be that most persons who would have enough affection for a child to adopt it as their
own would probably intend that it should be included in a reference to
their children.808 The observation may also be made that a construction
which includes the adopted child, where the adopter is the testator and
the adoption occurs after execution of the will, tends to make the instrument legally more effective than the opposite construction, if it is the
law of the jurisdiction that an adoption by the testator after execution
of a will nullifies the will to the same extent as the subsequent birth
of a child would.304
The other and complementary rule of construction announced bi
some courts is to the effect that if the maker of the instrument is .not
the adopter, it is to be presumed that a reference in the instrument to
the adopter's child or children does not include his adoptee.805 This
Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76, 151 A. 131 (1930); Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex.,
578, II7 S.W. (2d) 413 (1938).
•
802 Woodcock's Appeal, 103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907); Wilder v. Butler, II6
Me. 389, 102 A. IIO (1917); Dulfon v. Keasbey, I I I N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102
(1932); In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940); Albright v.
Albright, II6 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760 (1927). In Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Me.
578 at 583, 55 A. 520 (1903), the court said it would be "a reflection µpon the sense
of justice" of the adopter to hold that he did not intend to include, within the designation of his children as beneficiaries of life insurance policies, a child whom he adopted
after the policies were issued.
808 This may have been in the mind of the court in Wildman's Appeal, 111 Conn.
683 at 687, 151 A. 265 (1930), when it was said that where the testator is the adopting parent it is "reasonable" to presume that the word "child" or its equivaient in the
will was intended to include his adoptee.
804 See, for example, Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 41-107. And see annotations, 98
A.L.R. 190 at 194 (1935); 105 A.L.R. u76 (1936).
805 For various statements of the rule see Huxley v. Security Trust Co., (Del. Ch.
1943) 33 A. (2d) 679; Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788 (1925); Pierce
v. Farmers State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 480; Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App.
166, 146 N.E. 123 (1925); Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463, 192 N.E. 899
(1934); Savells v. Brown, 187 Ky. 134, 218 S.W. 462 (1920); Woodcock's Appeal,
103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907); Wilder v. Butler, u6 Me. 389, 102 A. II0
(1917); Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927); Ahlmeyer v.
Miller, 102 N.J. L. 54, 131 A. 54 (1925), affirmed 103 N.J. L. 617, 137 A. 543
(1927); Dulfon v. Keasbey, I l l N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932); Trenton Union
Trust Co. v. Gane, 125 N.J. Eq. 389, 6 A. (2d) 112 (1939), affirmed 126 N.J. Eq.
273, 8 A. (2d) 708 (1939); In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 340
(1940); In re Fisler, 131 N.J. Eq. 310, 25 A. (2d) 265 (1942), affirmed 133 N.J.
Eq. 421, 30 A. (2d) 894 (1943); Matter of Leask, 197 N.Y. 193, 90 N.E. 652 (1910);
Matter of Wait's Estate, (N.Y. Surr. 1943) 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 735; Smyth v. McKissick,
222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E. (2d) 621 (1943); Albright v.Albright,116 Ohio St. 668, 157
N.E. 760 (1927); Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932);
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rule had its origin with the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Woodcock's Appeal,806 where it was said:
"When in a will provision is made for 'a child or children' of
some other person than the testator, an adopted child is not included unless other language in the will makes it clear that he was
intended to be included ...." 307
A number of observations, both factual arid critical, may be made
with respect to this rule.
It will be noticed first that according to its terms the rule is confined
to the situation wher.e the designating words are "child" or "children."
Although courts finding merit in the rule will doubtless apply it as well
to another designation, such as "issue," 308 or even "heirs," 309 when
used as a synonym for "children," the rule is not applied if the reference
is to the general heirs or the statutory next of kin of the adopter.310 In
this respect the rule does not have the extensiveness of its statutory
counterpart in Massachusetts, where the presumption prescribed by the
law has been held to apply even to a designation of the adopter's heirs
at law. 811
Then, too, according to its original statement in Woodcock's A ppeal,812 the rule in terms applied only to wills. There being no basis
for such a restriction, it was never heeded, and the rule has been invoked
as to inter vivas instruments as well as wills.813
In its original form the rule seemingly permits rebuttal of the presumption only by other language in the instrument itself. 814 Convinced
Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N.W. 153 (1909). See also Leeper v. Leeper,
347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W. (2d) 660 (I<j41). And see 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§ 287 (1940).
.
806
.103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907).
807
103 Me; 214 at 217, 68 A. 821 (1907).
808
In re Fisler, 131 N.J. Eq. 310, 25 A. (2d) 265 (1942), affirmed 133 N.J.
Eq. 421, 30 A. (2d) 894 (1943). See also Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn.
61, II2 A. 689 (1921); Wildman's Appeal, III Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 (1930);
Huxley v. Security Trust Co., (Del. Ch. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 679; Dulfon v. Keasbey,
III N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932); Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182
N.E. 654 (1932).
809
See Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788 (1925).
810
Trenton Union Trust Co. v. Gane, 125 N.J. Eq. 389, 6 A. (2d) I 12 (1939),
affirmed 126 N.J. Eq. 273, 8 A. (2d) 708 (1939). And see supra, II, A, 6.
811
Wyeth v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441, I I N.E. 729 (1887).
812
103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907).
813
Savells v. Brown, 187 Ky. 134, 218 S.W. 462 (1920); Wilder v. Butler, II6
Me. 389, 102 A. 110 (1917); Ahlmeyer v. Miller, 102 N.J. L. 54, 131 A. 54
(1925), affirmed 103 N.J.L. 617, 137 A. 543 (1927); Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C.
644, 24 S.E. (2d) 621 (1943); Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654
(1932). See also Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W. (2d) 660 (1941).
814 Woodcock'sAppeal, 103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907).
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that the statement of the rule in this manner in one of its earlier
opinions 815 improperly prevented consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the Indiana Appellate Court modified the rule so as to
permit the presumption to be overthrown by extraneous circumstances.816 And the more reasonable statement of the rule elsewhere
permits rebuttal of the presumption by the attendant circumstances as
well as by the language of the instrument as a whole.817
What is the rationale of this rule? As it stands it has no satisfactory
one. In Woodcock's Appeal the statement of the rule is followed immediately by the remark that the testatrix there, who was the mother
of the adopter, "was under no sort of obligation, moral or family, to
make provision for" the adoptee. 818 It is hardly conceivable, however,
that the absence of an obligation owing from the maker of the instrument to the adoptee is the reason for the rule. If B devises property to
his friend C for life, remainder to C's children, B is under no more
obligation to C's natural children than to his adopted ones.
Preference for blood is also unsatisfactory as an explanation of the
rule. There is nothing in the form of the rule which prevents its application to a case where the maker of the instrument is wholly unrelated
to the adopter or related to him other than by blood.319 Moreover, any
attempt to predicate the rule on preference for blood encounters the
objection that the rule does not apply if the maker of the instrument
is the adopter himself, whose connections by blood to his natural children are even more immediate and binding than those between his
natural children and another person. Attention is directed to the fact,
however, that in Woodcock's Appeal,820 where the rule was first an815

Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N.E. 123 (1925).
Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind:App. 463, 192 N.E. 899 (1934). Although this
decision was disapproved in Pierce v. Farmers State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d)
480, the court in the latter case nevertheless stated the rule of construction in the form
of its modification in the Beck case.
817
Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788 ( 1925); Matter of Wait's
Estate, (N.Y. Surr. 1943) 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 735; Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24
S.E. (2d) 621 (1943). See also Wilder v. Butler, 116 Me. 389 at 384, 102 A. 110
(1917), where the court speaks of the presumption as controlling unless "in other ways"
the grantor's intention to the contrary appears.
818
103 Me. 214 at 217, 68 A. 821 (1907). The idea of an absence of obligation, where the instrument-maker is not the adopter, is also cited to justify the rule in
Wilderv. Butler, 116 Me. 389,102 A. 110 (1917); and In re McEwan, 128 N.J.
Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940).
819
In the case of In re Holden, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940), aside
from the court's objections to the rule in any event, the fact that the testatrix was not
related to the adopter by blood constituted particular reason for not applying the rule
there.
32
P 103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907).
316
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nounced, the court stressed the normal preference of a testator for his
own blood and stated another rule of construction, narrower in form,
to the effect that in the making of a devise over from his own children
to their "child or children," a testator is presumed to have intended
"child or children" of his own blood, and not to have intended his
estate to pass to a stranger to his blood. If an identity between the two
rules was meant, it has long since been destroyed.
The rule has other disquieting aspects. For one thing, it did not
exist from the beginning of the subject. In cases like Tirrell v. Bacon 821
and Hartwell v. Tefft, 822 which antedated W oo'dcock's Appeal,828 there
was no intimation of the rule, and adopted children were held to be
within the bounty of testato,r's gifts to the children or issue of another;
and this, even though the adoption took place after the testator's death.
The fact that express legislation was deemed necessary in Massachusetts to effect a result similar to the presumption 'later announced by
the Maine court would also appear to be significant.
Furthermore, authorities cited by courts invoking the rule are often
distinguishable .on fundamental grounds. For example, in Woodcock's
Appeal,824 origin of the rule, the sole authority cited to support it was
(I) Russell v. Russell,825 holding that the testator's own adopted child
was excluded from a gift in the will to his children because the narrowly
worded'Alabama statute raised an adoptee to the status of an heir only
and not of a child of the adopter; and (2) Schafer v. Eneu,826 in which
it appeared that the Pennsylvania statute had not been enacted until
after the testator died and in any event was also narrowly worded.
The Illinois case of Smith v. Thomas 827 also illustrates the irrelevance
of the authority which is often cited in support of the rule. The only
cases the court there cited in behalf of the rule were (I) Woodcock's
Appeal,828 which, as just seen, had relied on decisions involving other
material considerations; ( 2) Matter of Leask,829 which ultimately
turned on an express statutory provision to the effect that an adoptee
should not be q.eemed a child of the adopter so as to defeat a limitation
over to remaindermen conditioned on the adopter's dying without chil(C.C. Mass. 1880) 3 F. 62.
19 R.I. 644, 35 A. 882 (1896).
828
103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907).
324 Id.
325
84 Ala. 48, 3 S. 900 ( l 887).
826
54 Pa. 304 (1867).
827
317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788 (1925).
828
103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907).
829
197 N.Y. 193, 90 N.E. 652 (1910)..
821

822
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dren; (3) Elodgett v. Stowell, 330 which was decided under the express
Massachusetts statutory provision against an adoptee being deemed a
child of the adopter within the meaning of an instrument executed by
another; and (4) Eureka Life Ins. Co. v. Geis, 881 which turned on a
Maryland statute similar in effect to the Massachusetts one.
It is also of interest that almost every case which has invoked the
rule as a basis of decision has involved the further factor that the instrument was executed or became effective before the adoption, so that the
result could as well have rested on the posterior date of the adoption
and the implication of an absence of anticipation of the adoption when
the instrument was executed or became effective.882 In this connection
it was pointed out in Mooney v. Tolles: 833
"· .. It is significant, however, that in practically all of the
cases where this distinction [ with respect to instruments executed
by the adopter and those executed by third persons] has been given
effect, it appears . . . that the adoption took place long after the
testator's death, .... It is fairly to be inferred from the authorities
that, in determining whether the adopted child was in contemplation of a testator other than the adopting parent, the weighty consideration was the fact that the adoption, being subsequent to the
testator's death, was not known to him, together with the effect of
it upon the distribution of the estate, rather than that the testator
was not the adopting parent and might be presumed to be likely
to intend to favor his own blood as against a stranger thereto."
The reason for the rule has been described as "not apparent." 834
The rule itself has been characterized as "rather arbitrary," 885 and "as
880

189 Mass. 142, 75 N.E. 138 (1905).
121 Md. 196, 88 A. 158 (1913).
882
The single exception is Woodcock's Appeal, 103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907),
where the adoption occurred eight years before the will was executed and nine yea!8
before the death of the testatrix. It does not appear whether she knew or approved of
the adoption. In several cases where the rule was invoked the court stressed the fact that
the adoption took place after the execution or effective date of the instrument. Huxley
v. Security Trust Co., (Del. Ch. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 679; Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind.
App. 166, 146 N.E. 123 (1925); Ahlmeyer v. Miller, 102 N.J.L. 54, 131 A. 54
(1925), affirmed 103 N.J. L. 617, 137 A. 543 (1927); In re Fisler, 131 N.J. Eq.
310, 25 A. (2d) 265 (1942), affirmed 133 N.J. Eq. 421, 30 A. (2d) 894 (1943);
Matter of Wait's Estate, (N.Y. Surr. 1943) 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 735; Smyth v. McKissick,
222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E. (2d) 621 (1943). See also Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey,
96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Wildman's Appeal, I I I Conn. 683, 151 A. 265
(1930);-In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940).
888
I I I Conn. 1 at 9-10, 149 A. 515 (1930).
SH I PAGE, WILLS, 2d ed., § 900 (1926).
885
Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481 at 490, 121 N.W. 153 (1909).
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the sort of thing that makes for the despair of all who are interested in
the application of legal principles in the construction of written instruments, especially deeds and wills." 386 It is believed that actually the
rule is just a screen behind which lurks, whether the court realizes it or
not, the real reason for many of the decisions against inclusion of the
adoptee-the fear that adoption might be used as an instrument of selfinterest or spite~
_IV
CONCLUSION

In the drafting of wills and other private instruments, where terms
of general designation are employed, as in a devise or bequest to a person's "children," "issue," or "heirs," it is desirable that the instrument
state explicitly whether one who may be related by adoption to the
person mentioned is within the intendment of the expression used, and
also whether the particular term of designation is to include one related
by blood to the person mentioned, but adopted by a stranger. To
supply a prima facie answer to these questions, if the maker of. the instrument neglects to provide one himself, statutory presumptions in
harmony with broader legislative policy as to adoption generally have
considerable merit.
Unfortunately those who draft private instruments usually do not
consider the effect which adoption, and particularly future adoption,
will have upon the construction of such instruments. And in the United
States express statutory presumptions in this regard are not yet common. Resolution of the construction problems is thus thrust upon the
courts, which are forced to speculate upon what would or should have
been the intention of the instrument-maker if he had thought about the
matter. For the most part the conclusions reached by the courts have
not been favorable to the position of the -adoptee other than as an heir
or next of kin of the adopter. The decisions against the adoptee's
equivalence to one related correspondingly by blood are often predicated nominally upon arbitrary definitions, irrelevant circumstances and
qtles of construction having no substantial basis in reason. Sometimes
overlooked, moreover, is the distinction between statutes which are
narrowly worded with respect to the status which they confer upon an
adoptee and those which are broadly phrased. Rarely voiced, but unquestionably influencing the courts, is the apprehension that if adoption
were accorded the same legal significance as lawful natural birth it
might be employed for purposes of financial gain or as a spite device.
It is believed, however, that under modern adoption statutes, with their
highly developed procedural safeguards, this fear is not well grounded.
836

Kales, "Rights of Adopted Children," 9
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L. REV. 149 at 169 (1914).

